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Responding to disasters is a critical function for first responders and the 
emergency management community. The primary mission when responding to 
disasters is saving lives, which often requires the use of multiple resources. 
Rotary and fixed-winged aircraft have traditionally performed disaster response 
missions, such as overhead damage assessments, reconnaissance, and missing 
person searches. However, with the advancement of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UASs), there is an opportunity to perform many conventional aerial missions in a 
safer, more expeditious, and cost-effective manner. 
This thesis explores the introduction of UASs for disaster response 
missions into the national airspace system of the United States. It includes a 
review of traditional disaster response missions and opportunities for the 
utilization of UASs; a comparison of UAS programs, both military and civilian, as 
well as international UAS programs; and a review of barriers to implementation. It 
also offers policy and program considerations for agencies and jurisdictions to 
consider when implementing a UAS program, and it recommends future research 
concerning the topic of autonomous UASs. Lastly, this thesis provides a decision 
guide to assist policy makers and practitioners with determining the need and 
feasibility of a UAS program. 
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You don’t concentrate on risks. You concentrate on results. No risk 
is too great to prevent the necessary job from getting done. 
— Brigadier General Chuck Yeager, U.S. Air Force pilot 
 
Emergency management is at a crossroads as it pertains to unmanned 
aircraft systems (UASs). Disasters provide an environment that is conducive to 
using UASs to support the efforts of emergency responders, yet their use is not 
without controversy. With the advancement of UASs, there is an opportunity to 
perform many conventional aerial disaster response missions in a safer, more 
expeditious, and cost-efficient manner. 
In this thesis, the author argues the benefits of implementing UASs as a 
resource for emergency managers to use for mitigation, protection, response, 
and recovery efforts. However, the primary area of focus of this thesis is the 
disaster response mission area. Implementation of a UAS program, whether 
governmental or non-governmental, requires a significant commitment of funding 
and resources and warrants an in-depth review and analysis to ensure the 
implementation of such a program is feasible.  
This thesis includes a review of traditional disaster response missions and 
opportunities for the utilization of UASs; a comparison of UAS programs, both 
military and civilian, as well as international UAS programs; and a review of 
barriers to implementation. It also offers policy and program considerations for 
agencies and jurisdictions to consider when implementing a UAS program and 
recommends the topic of autonomous UASs as an area for future research. 
Additionally, this thesis offers seven recommendations to assist emergency 





 1. Conduct a Feasibility Study Prior to Implementation 
While there are benefits to implementing a UAS program for disaster 
response, agencies considering the establishment of a UAS program for disaster 
response missions, or any mission for that matter, should convene a feasibility 
study to evaluate the need for such a program. A UAS program should not be 
established simply for the sake of doing so or because it is perceived as the 
latest innovation in disaster response.  
 2. Program Funding 
It is necessary to have a dedicated funding source, whether new or a 
reallocation from existing programs, to procure, implement, and sustain a UAS 
program. While some agencies and jurisdictions are fortunate enough to have 
funding in their existing budgets to allocate for a UAS program, the reality is 
many do not. Chapter V of this thesis offers examples of potential funding 
sources and current barriers impacting the use of funding from those programs. 
Additionally, Chapter VII advances a recommendation for the establishment of 
dedicated program funding.  
 3. Public Engagement and Education 
Irrespective of its intent, whether implemented by emergency 
management, law enforcement, or homeland security missions, privacy concerns 
represent a significant barrier against the establishment of a UAS program. In 
order to mitigate this barrier, the author recommends the establishment of a 
public engagement and education program, reinforcing the benefits of using 
UASs for disaster response prior to the implementation of any such program.  
 4. Identify a Local Lead Agency for the UAS Program 
For UASs to gain acceptance for their potential humanitarian benefits, the 
local/county emergency management agency (EMA) should be the lead agency 
 xvii 
for a disaster response UAS program at the local level. Evidence has indicated 
the general public has concerns about privacy and government intrusion in 
relation to law enforcement and/or homeland security related UAS missions. 
Designating the local/county EMA as the lead agency for a disaster response 
UAS program can assist in mitigating or reducing many of the privacy and 
government intrusion concerns associated with law enforcement and/or 
homeland security UAS deployments. 
 5. Consider Establishing a State-Level UAS Center 
A UAS center situated at the state level as a proponent and supporter of 
UAS operations would serve as a valuable resource positioned to assist private 
and public sector partners with the establishment of a program. Chapter VI 
presents the Ohio/Indiana UAS Center as a partnership model for advancing the 
use of UASs; with Chapter VII advancing a recommendation for the 
establishment of a state-level UAS center.  
 6. Implement an Emergency Waiver Process for Immediate Life 
 Safety Disaster Response Missions 
Due to the life safety issues involved with disaster response, there is a 
need to streamline the approval of emergency UAS flight operations. The current 
24-hour timeframe for the issuance of an emergency Certificate of Waiver or 
Authorization (COA) is unacceptable and needlessly jeopardizes human lives. 
The question of whether a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) liaison working 
with a state-level UAS center or the FAA UAS Integration Office has the authority 
to issue the authorization/approval is largely inconsequential, as long as the 
approval process is immediate. However, there must be a process in place to 





 7. Establishment of an FAA Liaison Office for Local and State  
  Government 
The final recommendation and arguably one of the most challenging to 
implement is the establishment of a liaison office within the FAA to work directly 
with local and state government agencies seeking to establish a UAS program. 
With a sole focus on local and state government programs, the liaison office 
would be able to expeditiously approve authorization requests as it would not be 
distracted with the management and approval of UAS operations for private 
sector organizations. 
DECISION GUIDE 
The decision whether to implement a UAS program requires an in-depth 
analysis and needs assessment as part of a comprehensive decision-making 
process. Appendix A of this thesis provides a decision guide as a resource for 
policy makers and practitioners to review when considering the implementation of 
a UAS program. The intent of the decision guide is to provide policy makers and 
practitioners with factors for consideration when assessing the need and 
feasibility for an agency or jurisdictional UAS program. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
With an opportunity to be on the leading edge of the UAS revolution, it is 
an exciting time to be in emergency management. The author argues the field of 
emergency management should move forward with the establishment of UAS 
programs for disaster response by embracing UAS technology and the many 
benefits it offers for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery mission 
operations. While this thesis recognizes the necessity to regulate the use of 
UASs in the national airspace system (NAS), such regulation cannot stymie the 
implementation of UAS programs for governmental agencies, especially for 
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When it comes to taking risks, I believe there are two kinds of 
people: those who don’t dare try new things, and those who don’t 
dare miss them.  
— John C. Maxwell, Author  
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Responding to disasters is a critical function for first responders and the 
emergency management community. The primary mission when responding to 
disasters is saving lives, which often requires multiple resources. To respond as 
efficiently as possible, it is necessary for first responders, incident command 
posts (ICPs), and emergency operations centers (EOCs) to have an assessment 
of the impact of a disaster, including the location of survivors, a basic preliminary 
damage assessment, and a common operating picture (COP). While this 
assessment is often performed on the ground by the first arriving units, there are 
times when the conditions within a disaster area (e.g., size, extent of damage, 
environmental contamination) require an overhead assessment to gauge the 
impact of the disaster and/or search for survivors. Although rotary and/or fixed-
winged aircraft provided by local, state, and federal agencies have traditionally 
accomplished these overhead assessments, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) 
are less expensive, more rapidly deployed, and are safer to operate in hazardous 
conditions than conventional aircraft.  
This exploratory thesis argues that UASs will enhance disaster response 
by providing first responders and emergency managers, hereafter referred to as 
emergency responders, with additional options when responding to various 
calamities. The foundation of this argument begins with a review of current and 
historical methods of providing aerial support for disaster response operations. 
This foundation serves as a means of providing a baseline recognition of 
traditional mission platforms. This thesis also explores various UAS programs 
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currently in place and offers policy and program considerations. The primary 
outcome of this thesis is a decision guide for policy makers and practitioners 
within an emergency management organization to use when assessing the need 
to establish a UAS program. 
The topic of UASs for disaster response presents complex issues that are 
of significant interest to the emergency management community as evidenced by 
the litany of articles discussing the potential uses of UASs for disaster response 
missions. The determination of the criteria and content that would comprise a 
decision guide for an emergency management UAS program warrants graduate-
level research. This level of research is necessary due to the need to identify the 
program and policy implications concerning their use to ensure operations are 
consistent with existing statutes and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules 
and regulations. An analysis that addresses sub-questions, such as barriers to 
implementation, program design, training, maintenance, and privacy 
requirements, supports the aforementioned intent of this thesis.  
Much of the existing research and information concerning UASs focuses 
on military, law enforcement, and homeland security missions or topics such as 
privacy issues regarding the broad-based integration of UASs into domestic, non-
military applications. In addition, this thesis focuses on an emergency 
management perspective for disaster response, which is a topic representing a 
significant gap in the potential domestic use of UASs in the United States. This 
gap is an important area to explore as the mission requirements for emergency 
management, as well as the information collected and missions performed, vary 
significantly from military, law enforcement, and homeland security applications.  
While there is a litany of articles discussing the potential uses of UASs for 
disaster response, there is a lack of significant research on the subject. This lack 
of research is not unique and has been observed with other emergent 
technologies over the past several years, including social media platforms and 
body cameras. In both of these cases, as well as what has occurred thus far with 
deploying UASs for disaster response missions, the available technology far 
3 
exceeds existing research and policy. This has often resulted in the technology 
either not being used or not being used to its potential.     
Additionally, as a result of the lack of a national policy standard for UASs,1 
there is a need for a model or framework for emergency managers that will serve 
as a de facto decision guide when considering the implementation of a UAS 
program. Even as policies begin to emerge, there is a policy gap at the local and 
state levels of government that must be bridged for an emergency management 
UAS program, as the policy will vary significantly from military, law enforcement, 
and homeland security UAS policies.  
To assist in outlining components and topics of consideration for a 
decision guide, this author analyzed potential disaster scenarios, current UAS 
applications, barriers to implementation, and comparative UAS programs. This 
level of analysis was necessary to ensure the proposed thesis topic fully explored 
the anticipated range of use and the framework necessary for a structured 
disaster response centric UAS program.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Effective disaster response requires the ability to meet the immediate 
needs of the survivors and to provide a rapid damage assessment of the impacts 
of the incident. As technology continues to evolve, the use of UASs should be 
considered as there is credible evidence that indicates they provide for a safer, 
timelier, and cost effective response option for disaster response than many 
traditional practices using conventional rotary and fixed-winged assets.2 This is a 
                                            
1 Jeanie Moore, “Da Vinci’s Children Take Flight: Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the 
Homeland” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 3. 
2 “UAS Operations Most Frequently Asked Questions,” Mesa County, CO Sheriff’s Office, 
November 1, 2015, http://sheriff.mesacounty.us/uav/; Robin Murphy, “Drones Save Lives in 
Disasters, When They’re Allowed to Fly (Op-Ed),” Space, accessed November 1, 2015, 
http://www.space.com/30555-beginning-with-katrina-drones-save-lives-in-disasters.html; Anuj 
Puri, A Survey of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for Traffic Surveillance (Tampa, FL: University 
of South Florida, 2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.108.8384&rep=rep1&type=pdf2.  
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critical observation as it reinforces the use of UASs as an operationally sound 
option for disaster response.  
The key research question asked by this thesis is: What are the policy and 
program considerations when developing a disaster response centric UAS 
program? As noted previously, this is an important question as the emergency 
management use of UASs for responding to disasters varies significantly 
between traditional military, law enforcement, and homeland security missions.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis includes a qualitative analysis of literature, a 
comparative analysis of programs, and policy modeling to develop a decision 
guide. A qualitative analysis of existing articles, research, and source documents 
facilitated research and analysis into identifying system design and program 
requirements. As part of the qualitative analysis research, the author found merit 
in conducting a comparative analysis of national and international UAS 
programs.  
The comparative analysis research focuses on Australia and Canada as 
both nations have UAS regulations and legislation governing domestic operations 
similar in nature to those of the United States. In particular, Australia was 
selected as it was the first nation to draft laws and legislation pertaining to the 
use of UASs for civil operations.3 This comparison and contrast assisted in the 
formulation of the recommendations advanced by this thesis. 
Because there is no national policy framework that can serve as a model 
for the development of jurisdictional plans for the use of UASs in disaster 
response, a policy modeling method was used to develop a decision guide for 
use by policy makers and practitioners when assessing the need and feasibility 
of a UAS program. With the ongoing development and implementation of 
                                            
3 RPAS Training and Solutions, “Drone Laws in Australia: Are You Flying Your UAV / RPA 
Legally?,” RPAS Training & Solutions, accessed August 9, 2015, http://www.rpastraining.com.au/
casr-101-uav-drone-legal-or-illegal; James Coyne, UAS Regulatory Developments, Civil Aviation 
Safety Authority, Australia, accessed August 15, 2015, http://goo.gl/YLOueI.  
5 
legislative statutes and regulations, including FAA rules and regulations for use, 
the policy modeling method assisted with identifying key elements and criteria 
necessary when developing and implementing policy for a UAS program. 
However, to remain current, this thesis did not delve into the intricacies of local 
ordinances, state statutes, federal laws, executive orders, rules or regulations, as 
they are rapidly evolving.  
Additionally, this thesis focuses on answering the research questions from 
a governmental use perspective and did not significantly address the private or 
commercial uses of UASs. To do otherwise would have significantly increased 
the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, large-scale UASs (e.g., Predator, Global 
Hawk) were not significantly reviewed as part of the research for this thesis. This 
was an intentional decision as the focus of this thesis is on UAS platforms that 
are both readily accessible by local governmental agencies and easily 
transported via standard departmental vehicles.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provides the foundation for the research of this 
thesis. Literature discussing past, present, and future uses for UASs, 
conventional aerial missions during disasters, military uses of UASs, international 
UAS programs, examples of domestic UAS missions performed to date, and 
barriers to implementing domestic UAS programs were located in a variety of 
sources. The source information for this thesis was obtained via a review and 
analysis of technical and trade journals, media articles, numerous professional 
association websites, governmental agency websites, published articles, 
published theses work, and government publications. Based on the research 
conducted for this thesis, the sources are sorted into five primary categories: 
• Historical perspective of aerial missions for disaster response  
• The expansion of UASs from military to civilian use 
• Comparison of UAS programs 
• Potential domestic uses of UASs for disaster response 
6 
• Barriers complicating the domestic use of UASs for disaster 
response 
1. Historical Perspective of Aerial Missions for Disaster 
Response  
To assist in understanding the benefits of developing a UAS program for 
emergency management, it is important to understand the traditional methods 
and platforms used for disaster response missions. A variety of source material 
notes the use of aerial assessments for obtaining damage estimates in the 
aftermath of disasters, as well as for reconnaissance and mapping purposes. For 
instance, Sherman Fairchild, the developer of the Fairchild Camera, performed 
one of the first non-military aerial assessments when mapping Manhattan, New 
York in 1921.4 Subsequent aerial missions for post-disaster damage 
assessments were conducted throughout the twentieth century and have 
continued into the twenty-first century. Examples of recent twenty-first century 
aerial damage assessment missions includes disasters such as the 2011 
Japanese earthquake and resultant tsunami that led to the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Plant disaster5 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012.6 The need for aerial 
missions to determine the impact of disasters will continue, whether they are 
performed via rotary and/or fixed-winged aircraft, UASs, or satellites. Given that 
platforms for obtaining damage assessment information vary according to the 
resources that are available, recognition of the advantages offered by UASs 
should be considered as unmanned platforms shift from primarily a military 
centric focus to a more domestic role for public safety and humanitarian 
purposes.    
                                            
4 Paul R. Baumann, “History of Remote Sensing, Aerial Photography,” State University of 
New York, Oneonta, accessed September 7, 2015, http://www.oneonta.edu/faculty/baumanpr/
geosat2/RS%20History%20I/RS-History-Part-1.htm.  
5 Brian Everstine, “Drones Play Role in Disaster Response,” Navy Times, November 26, 
2013, http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20131126/NEWS/311260021/Drones-play-role-
disaster-response.  
6 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Responding to Hurricane Sandy,” last 
modified November 9, 2012, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/weeklynews/oct12/nos-
response-sandy.html.  
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2. The Expansion of UASs from Military to Civilian Use  
Numerous literary sources in the literature note the expanded use of UASs 
from primarily a military application to civilian use; however, many of these 
sources highlight the use of military-type UASs for civilian missions.7 For 
example, while military-type UASs have served as a valuable resource for 
situations such as performing radiation monitoring at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan,8 the realities are that the use of Department of Defense (DOD) assets—
whether active duty, Reserve Component, or National Guard—for domestic 
disaster response within the United States involves a complicated approval 
process.  
For example, a February 17, 2015, memo from the U.S. DOD complicates 
the use of military assets for civilian disaster response as the domestic use of 
National Guard owned UASs requires the approval of the secretary of defense 
(SecDef).9 This approval requirement can significantly delay, or eliminate, the 
ability of the National Guard to provide UAS support during a disaster. While 
such a delay or denial presents challenges, there are other options for obtaining 
UAS support.   
Upon determination by the state emergency operations center (SEOC) 
that a UAS asset is required for a given mission and there are no UAS assets 
available within the state, a request can be made asking the federal government 
to provide the support, contingent upon the proper emergency declarations being 
in place. For the federal government to provide UAS support to local and/or state 
governments, assuming local officials and the governor have issued the 
                                            
7 Everstine, “Drones Play Role in Disaster Response.”  
8 Ibid.  
9 U.S. Department of Defense, Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft 





necessary declarations, a request is initiated through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to another federal agency. Requests can also be 
forwarded to the defense coordinating officer within one of the FEMA regional 
offices as a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission. While DSCA 
support can provide critical resources to support local and state disaster 
response efforts, it can take a significant amount of time to assign and fulfill 
mission requests, as there is a requirement for the state to exhaust or exceed its 
resource capabilities prior to requesting DSCA support.10 Absent a lack of state 
resources and/or the issuance of an emergency or disaster declaration, DSCA 
support via active duty DOD assets is limited.   
While the UAS assets maintained by the DOD have exceptional video and 
air monitoring capabilities, similar technologies are available on civilian platforms 
that are much smaller, less expensive, and more easily transported.11 This is but 
one example that supports the efficacy of disaster response centric UAS 
programs for local and state government agencies.   
3. Comparison of UAS Programs 
As there are over 50 nations deploying UASs for military purposes 
alone,12 this thesis reviews literature pertaining to international UAS programs 
and UASs for military applications. The research on international programs 
focuses on Australia, Canada, and the United States due to similarities in the 
government oversight of domestic UASs within these nations. 
                                            
10 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Homeland Defense and America’s Security 
Affairs, Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, January 2008, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/
DOD_SupportToDomesticIncidents.pdf.  
11 Carol Kuruvilla. “Photos: High-Tech Drones Find Non-War, Civilian Uses,” NY Daily News, 
February 21, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/photos-high-tech-drones-find-non-
war-civilian-article-1.1270332.  
12 “The Drones of War,” Strategic Comments 15, no. 4 (2009): 1–2, doi: 10.1080/
13567880903040825.  
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Australia prides itself on being the first nation to have enacted legislation 
governing the use of UASs for domestic missions.13 Australia’s Civil Aviation 
Safety Authority (CASA) is responsible for providing the safe regulation of 
domestic flight operations in Australia.14 Similar to Australia’s CASA, the 
regulation of UASs in Canada is administered by Transport Canada for civilian 
use and by the Canadian Department of National Defence for military 
applications.15 Lastly, the FAA is tasked with providing a safe and efficient 
national airspace system (NAS) for the continental United States.16 Literature 
reviewed for this thesis explores these comparative programs to offer a 
comparison and contrast of the UAS programs in those nations, thereby assisting 
with the formulation of the recommendations offered by this thesis.  
4. Potential Domestic Uses of UASs for Disaster Response   
The potential use of UASs for disaster response warrants research to 
identify the program and policy implications of using UASs for disaster response 
missions. Research on recent disasters, such as a landslide in Oso, WA, flooding 
in South Carolina and Wyoming, wildfires in California and Yosemite National 
Park, and an April 2015 earthquake in Nepal, are situations where UASs have 
been or potentially could have been used.17 Aside from disaster response 
missions, preparedness missions, such as agricultural and infrastructure 
inspections, wide-area mapping for geographic information system applications, 
                                            
13 RPAS Training and Solutions, “Drone Laws in Australia.”  
14 Civil Aviation Safety Authority, “About CASA,” accessed February 9, 2016, 
https://www.casa.gov.au/standard-page/about-casa.  
15 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Drones in Canada,” November 21, 2013, 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2013/drones_201303_e.asp#heading-004-
1.  
16 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726 (1958).  
17 Everstine, “Drones Play Role in Disaster Response;” Robin Murphy, “Oso, Washington 
Mudslides: We Had the UAVs There but Didn’t Fly,” last modified April 1, 2014, Crasar, 
http://crasar.org/2014/04/01/oso-washington-mudslides-we-had-the-uavs-there-but-didnt-fly/; 
Brent Klavon, “Why We Need Drones,” The Gainesville Sun, last modified December 2, 2013, 
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20131202/OPINION/131209953?p=1&tc=pg.  
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and commodity flow studies, represent areas of disaster readiness and 
preparedness that would benefit from the use of UASs.  
While the terms drone and UAS are commonly associated with military-
type platforms, there is an emergent philosophy favoring smaller or micro UASs, 
which can be transported in a vehicle. Small or micro UASs offer a rapidly 
deployable option that is less expensive to operate in comparison to military-type 
UASs and traditional rotary or fixed-winged assets.18 One example of the use of 
small or micro-sized UASs was at the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant 
accident in Japan where 40 missions were flown over a three-month period from 
April to July 2011 “in order to conduct radiological surveys, visual damage 
assessment for structural integrity monitoring, and debris removal forecasts.”19 
This type of structural integrity and environmental monitoring is critical in 
establishing an on-scene assessment prior to committing resources downrange 
in a contaminated environment and to assist incident command staff in making 
personal protective equipment and population protective action decisions.  
The author reviewed Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses written by 
Moore and Wallace to determine the need for additional academic work related 
to disaster response missions for UASs. While Moore’s thesis addresses the use 
of UASs in the homeland, it primarily focuses on “an orientation to the key 
considerations in UAS integration.”20 In contrast, Wallace’s thesis focuses on 
“possibilities and advantages of incorporating the use of [UAS] into operational 
use by local public safety agencies.”21 While both theses are well researched 
                                            
18 Heather Kelly, “Drones: The Future of Disaster Response,” CNN, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/23/tech/drones-the-future-of-disaster-response/index.html.  
19 Brittany A. Duncan, and Robin R. Murphy, “Autonomous Capabilities for Small Unmanned 
Aerial Systems Conducting Radiological Response: Findings from a High-Fidelity Discovery 
Experiment: Autonomous Capabilities for SUAS Conducting Radiological Response,” Journal of 
Field Robotics 31, no. 4 (2014): 522–536, doi:10.1002/rob.21503.  
20 Moore, “Da Vinci’s Children Take Flight.”  
21 John A. Wallace, “Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Modern Policing in an 
Urban Environment” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012).  
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and written, neither specifically examined the potential emergency management 
uses of UASs.  
A thesis by Momont takes a different perspective from that of Moore and 
Wallace. Momont primarily reviews the potential use of UASs when responding 
to emergencies or disasters, though he also references general public safety 
response operations. One novel concept Momont addresses is the deployment of 
an “ambulance drone” to respond to situations necessitating the use of an 
automated external defibrillator (AED).22 By expanding the use of UASs to serve 
in an operational capacity, such as an “ambulance drone,” AEDs, first-aid kits, 
and prescription medications could arguably be provided faster than traditional 
ground transportation methods. Additionally, an “ambulance drone” could provide 
access to areas that would otherwise be temporarily inaccessible to emergency 
personnel in the aftermath of a disaster (e.g., collapsed buildings, flood zones). 
Further research identified a process outlined by Quaritisch et al. that not 
only provides video of a disaster area via a UAS platform but introduces the 
concept of an aerial sensor network via multiple UASs for achieving a 
comprehensive COP of the environment.23 This type of UAS network could be 
very helpful, for example, in the case of geo-mapping and wide area searches for 
missing persons. 
5. Barriers Complicating the Domestic Use of UASs for Disaster 
Response 
The author’s research reveals numerous barriers that complicate the use 
of UASs for disaster response, including public perception (i.e., privacy 
concerns), current FAA rules and regulations, and a general lack of 
organizational policy structures. While none of these areas are insurmountable, 
                                            
22 Alec Momont, “Drones for Good” (master’s thesis, Technical University of Delft, 2014).  
23 Markus Quaritsch et al., “Networked UAVs as Aerial Sensor Network for Disaster 
Management Applications,” e & i Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik 127, no. 3 (2010): 56–
63.    
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they nonetheless represent challenges for agencies considering the use of UASs 
within the United States. 
Privacy concerns have been raised that the domestic use of UASs may 
infringe upon the right to privacy afforded under the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. Recognizing public concerns about the use of UASs to conduct 
domestic spy missions, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
proactively assigned the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Privacy 
Office to lead a working group ensuring the domestic use of UASs does not 
violate individual rights to privacy.24 The Obama administration has taken this a 
step further through the issuance of a presidential memorandum that recognizes 
the need to promote innovation and “economic competitiveness” regarding the 
domestic use of UAVs [UASs] while at the same time providing protections for 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.25 This memorandum reinforces the 
necessary linkage between innovation, privacy, and civil liberties. These critical 
areas are further addressed and analyzed in Chapter V of this thesis.  
Another potential barrier concerning the domestic use of UASs is based 
on ethical considerations. These concerns go beyond the apprehension 
expressed in Oso, WA, for example, in the aftermath of the March 2014 landslide 
wherein there were concerns that pictures of the deceased would be publicly 
accessible.26 Gilman provides an interesting observation as he opines, “The 
military remains the largest user of UAVs [UASs], while the manufacturers are 
primarily military contractors. This situation raises ethical and operational 
considerations for humanitarian organizations, who may not wish to be 
                                            
24 Julie Bird, “DHS Seeks to Head off Domestic UAV Privacy Concerns,” 
FierceGovernmentIT, February 25, 2013, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/dhs-
seeks-head-domestic-uav-privacy-concerns/2013-02-25. http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/
story/dhs-seeks-head-domestic-uav-privacy-concerns/2013-02-25.  
25 “Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” press release, Office of the Press 
Secretary, White House, February 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/
02/15/presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua.  
26 Murphy, “Oso, Washington Mudslides: We Had the UAVs.”  
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associated even indirectly with military actors.”27 While Gilman’s opinion is 
recognized, further research (see Chapter V) has failed to locate sufficient 
evidence to support Gilman’s assertion. 
Yet an additional barrier that complicates the use of UASs for disaster 
response missions are the FAA restrictions on the use of UASs by government 
agencies. While there are processes for emergency requests, research indicates 
the typical turnaround time to obtain a non-emergency Certificate of Waiver or 
Authorization (COA) for government agency UAS use is approximately 60 
days.28 Even with a one-time emergency waiver, the timeframe required to 
obtain a COA is mission prohibitive for real-time response to disasters and 
presents a significant barrier to those agencies that may be interested in using 
UASs for immediate disaster response missions.  
Research on FAA regulations pertaining to the government use of UASs 
found the release of guidance for law enforcement agencies on January 8, 2015, 
concerning the unauthorized use of UASs,29 and additional guidance on 
February 15, 2015, which outlines the use of small UASs.30 However, the 
February 2015, small-UAS rule does not apply to government use “unless the 
operator opts to comply with and fly under the new small UAV [UAS] 
regulations.”31 As such, the current small UAV (or UAS) regulations are not 
practical for disaster response missions as they prohibit flying a UAS over 
people.32 This prohibition eliminates one of the key missions when responding to 
                                            
27 Daniel Gilpin, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Humanitarian Response, ed. Matthew Easton 
(New York: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014), 9. 
28 Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), last 
updated March 2015, https://www.faa.gov/uas/faq/media/1009_UAS_Fact_Sheet.pdf.  
29 Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Issues UAS Guidance for Law Enforcement,” 
January 8, 2015, https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=81244.  
30 Operations and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. §21, 43, 45, 
47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183 (2015).  
31 Federal Aviation Administration, “DOT and FAA Propose New Rules for Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems,” news release, February 15, 2015, http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/
news_story.cfm?newsId=18295.  
32 Ibid.  
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disasters, which requires UASs to potentially fly over people on the ground when 
locating survivors.  
In an effort to address public concerns, a 60-day public comment period 
on the new small UAS rule closed in April 2015 and comments are still going 
through the adjudication process as of the date of this thesis. Until such time an 
adjudication of those comments occurs and revised rules are released, current 
FAA regulations remain in effect.33 A review and vetting of all public comments 
related to the new UAS rules is required by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA),34 which will further delay the issuance of new UAS procedures.35 Even 
once the new rules are approved, Nicas and Pasztor note the implementation of 
any new rules could take upwards of two years,36 which is of further concern as 
there have already been significant delays in the release of commercial and 
public agency regulations and guidance by the FAA.37 Any further delays in 
issuing updated guidance are unacceptable as they further limit the ability of 
governmental agencies to deploy UASs during times of disaster; however, it is 
recognized that the APA process is partially responsible for the delays in issuing 
updated UAS guidance. 
 
 
                                            
33 Ibid.  
34 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, 79th Cong. (1946). 
35 Ibid.  
36 Jack Nicas, and Andy Pasztor, “Drone Flights Face FAA Hit,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 24, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/drone-flights-face-faa-hit-1416793905.  
37 Separate but related to the public and private use of UASs, the FAA issued guidelines on 
December 21, 2015, requiring the registration of small UASs weighing between 0.55 and 55 
pounds. As with any aircraft, the penalty for failing to register is punishable by “civil penalties up 
to $27,500.” Criminal penalties for failing to register “can include fines of up to $250,000…and/or 
imprisonment up to 3 years.” Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned 
Aircraft, Fed. Reg. 80 (2015) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 1, 45, 47, 48, 91, and 375). 
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II. HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES FOR AERIAL 
PLATFORMS SUPPORTING DISASTER RESPONSE MISSIONS 
To know your future, you must know your past. 
— George Santayana, philosopher 
 
The need for practitioners to educate policy makers as they develop new 
policies or programs (e.g., for the use of UASs in disaster response) necessitates 
an understanding of historical and current disaster response operations to 
develop a common framework from which to work. Once a common framework is 
established, research and evidence are allied to strengthen the position posited 
by the practitioner. This ultimately leads to a comprehensive analysis outlining 
the benefits of a given policy or program change. In the case of considering the 
benefits of UAS use in disaster response missions, it is also important to identify 
the information needs that drive the need for operational support from aerial 
assets.  
A. INFORMATION NEEDS DURING DISASTER RESPONSE AND 
RECOVERY 
Regardless of the type of disaster or its scope (e.g., life safety, storm 
location/path, duration, geographic impact), there are inherent information needs. 
One of the first information needs is a confirmation of the impact and extent of 
damage resulting from the disaster. For incidents such as earthquakes, 
tornadoes, hurricanes, and flash flooding, the need to expeditiously locate 
survivors is critical and warrants immediate access to resources that can assist in 
locating and guiding emergency responders to their location to initiate rescue 
efforts.  
Once life safety measures have commenced, the magnitude of the 
disaster must be determined to guide the formation of a COP to assist in 
determining incident priorities and initial mission assignments. A key component 
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to the development of a comprehensive COP is having situational awareness 
(SA) of the incident. Though it has been superseded, the 2008 National 
Response Framework (NRF) describes situational awareness as the “ability to 
identify, process, and comprehend the critical information about an incident… 
Situational awareness requires continuous monitoring of relevant sources of 
information regarding actual incidents and developing incidents.”38 For the 
purposes of this thesis, essential elements of information from the SA can 
include, but are not limited to, the location of survivors, preliminary damage 
assessments, environmental monitoring, geologic monitoring (e.g., for 
landslides), aerial photographs and video, status of roadways for response units, 
and potential hazards. 
This SA must then be shared to form a comprehensive COP, which is 
defined in the FEMA National Incident Support Manual as “a shared situational 
awareness that offers a standard overview of an incident and provides incident in 
a manner that enables incident leadership and any supporting agencies and 
organizations to make effective, consistent, coordinated, and timely decisions.”39 
The need for SA and a comprehensive COP often warrant the need for aerial 
assessments, monitoring, and search capabilities that have been provided by a 
variety of conventional platforms, including rotary and fixed-winged aircraft and 
satellites.  
B. HISTORICAL AERIAL SUPPORT FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 
ASSESSMENT MISSIONS 
Determining the impact of a disaster is critical for emergency responders 
as they need an accurate assessment of damage in order to respond sufficiently 
to rescue survivors and stabilize a given incident. Prior to the use of aircraft and 
satellites for obtaining damage assessments, visual images of disaster damage 
                                            
38 U.S Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
U.S Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 32.  
39 U.S Department of Homeland Security, FEMA National Incident Support Manual 
(Washington, DC: U.S Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 21.  
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were typically captured at ground level. Even in present day emergency 
response, the initial, on-scene assessment of an emergency or disaster is often 
captured from the ground level. While the information gathered from the ground 
level is helpful, a more comprehensive assessment is necessary. To accomplish 
this assessment, first responders and emergency managers have traditionally 
relied on rotary and fixed-winged aircraft to perform overhead assessments of 
disaster areas.   
Aerial assessments via fixed-winged aircraft date to the early twentieth 
century for missions such as the mapping of Manhattan40 and include the more 
recent combined use of Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmosphere Administration (NOAA) assets to capture the damage sustained by 
over 35,000 properties as a result of Hurricane Sandy.41 Additionally, the use of 
satellites for damage assessments has proven to be a valuable tool during recent 
disasters, such as the April 2015 7.8 magnitude earthquake in Nepal. However, 
as with the cost for rotary and fixed-winged aircraft support, the cost for satellite 
imagery can be expensive and is not readily accessible for time-sensitive 
missions, such as locating survivors of flash flooding or a building collapse. 
Furthermore, there can be a significant, if not complete, degradation of the 
quality of the satellite imagery due to building obstructions and cloud, fog, or 
smoke cover.  
While the use of UASs for aerial assessments may be thought of as a 
recent trend, their use has a long and storied past. One of the earliest historical 
observations of drone or UAS use was on August 22, 1849, by Austria for an 
attack on Venice using 200 pilotless balloons. The first use of a UAS or drone 
type of vehicle in the United States dates back to the Civil War, which saw the 
rudimentary use of unmanned balloons for reconnaissance and bombing 
                                            
40 Baumann, “History of Remote Sensing, Aerial Photography.”  
41 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Responding to Hurricane Sandy.”  
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missions. This use expanded during the Spanish-American War with what would 
become the first aerial reconnaissance photos.42  
Further UAS use occurred during World War I, World War II, and the Cold 
War. In addition, the Vietnam War saw extensive use of UASs with over 34,000 
surveillance missions conducted between 1964 and 1975.43 After the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the use of modern-day UASs made the transition 
from a reconnaissance platform to an offensive weapons-based military platform 
with their debut as an armed platform in Afghanistan approximately four weeks 
later.44 The subsequent use of UASs for offensive military purposes by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. armed forces and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies continues in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, 
Somalia, Syria, and Yemen.45 This use has served to shape the public 
perception of UASs and presents challenges when considering domestic UAS 
applications in not only the United States but other nations as well. 
Evidence of the connotations and hurdles related to the domestic use of 
UASs is reinforced by polls such as one conducted by Monmouth University that 
noted while 83 percent of those polled approve of the use of UASs for missions 
such as search and rescue missions, 51 percent doubt that law enforcement 
agencies would use them appropriately.46 This perception continues to present 
challenges for public safety agencies and needs addressed via a public 
information strategy that will instill confidence and trust in the eyes of the public 
concerning the domestic use of UASs. 
                                            
42 “History of U.S. Drones,” Understanding Empire, accessed August 21, 2015, 
https://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2-0-a-brief-history-of-u-s-drones/. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 “History of U.S. Drones,” Understanding Empire; Chris Cole, “Drones in Iraq and Syria: 
What We Know and What We Don’t,” Drone Wars, July 11, 2014, http://dronewars.net/2014/11/
07/drones-in-iraq-and-syria-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont/.  
46 Monmouth University, National: U.S. Support Unarmed Drones (Monmouth University, 
West Long Branch, NJ: 2013), http://goo.gl/PPSkpQ.  
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C. CURRENT AERIAL ASSESSMENT MISSIONS 
Focusing at the local and state levels of government, rotary and fixed-
winged aircraft currently provide the majority of disaster response and recovery 
aerial assessments of disaster areas for emergency managers. For example, in 
the state of Ohio, aerial support at the state level and/or in support of local 
communities is a mission supported through the SEOC in accordance with the 
Aviation Support Plan Annex to the “Emergency Support Function (ESF)-1” 
portion of the State of Ohio Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).47 For incidents 
such as a flash flood, the Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) can deploy aircraft 
with forward looking infrared (FLIR) capabilities to search for survivors. Other 
aerial missions that can be performed include damage assessments, 
transportation of confirmation test samples (e.g., harmful algal bloom) for water 
systems, and senior official flight missions to areas impacted by disasters.  
Many jurisdictions have used rotary-winged aircraft during disasters for 
search and rescue operations, water rescue operations, and to deliver food, 
water, equipment, and other essentials to areas they were not able to reach via 
other means.48 While missions such as those mentioned above have been 
performed successfully; there are inherent risks associated with using rotary and 
fixed-winged assets, as evidenced in the recent crash of a helicopter rendering 
post-earthquake disaster relief in Nepal.49 The use of UASs for disaster 
response has the potential to reduce these risks.  
                                            
47 Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Operations Plan: Emergency Support 
Function 1, Aviation Support Plan (Columbus, OH: Ohio Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 
http://ema.ohio.gov/Documents/Ohio_EOP/ESF%201%20-
%20Aviation%20Support%20Plan%20-%20Tab%20A.pdf.  
48 Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security, “Tennessee Highway Patrol’s 
Aviation Unit Trains for Emergency Response Missions,” Tennessee Department of Safety and 
Homeland Security, March 12, 2014, https://www.tn.gov/safety/news/4985; Todd Unger, “National 
Guard Chopper Crew Recounts Water Rescues,” WFAA, May 12, 2015, http://www.wfaa.com/
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27157795/.  




However, many missions (e.g., rescue operations, delivery of food and 
equipment) require rotary and fixed-winged aircraft in lieu of a small UAS due the 
extent and weight of the payload they are able to carry. Even many non-heavy lift 
missions, such as obtaining SA when developing a COP, have been traditionally 
performed by rotary and fixed-winged assets. While effective, rotary and fixed-
winged assets are expensive to operate and maintain. For example, the 
estimated hourly cost to operate a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter is approximately 
$5,897, while the cost for law enforcement agencies to operate a single-engine, 
fixed-winged aircraft is approximately $200 per hour, not counting staff cost.50 
These costs are considerable and can be minimized by deploying UASs for those 
missions not requiring heavy-lift aircraft.  
Another existent source for aerial reconnaissance is the CAP. The CAP is 
the official auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force and has served the United States during 
disasters since World War II. One of the primary missions of the CAP is to assist 
with air and ground search and rescue and disaster relief operations.51 The CAP 
was recently deployed to provide assistance due to major flooding that occurred 
as a result of Hurricane Joaquin in South Carolina in October 2015.52 During this 
response, the CAP assisted with assessing damage to roadways, bridges, and 
infrastructure that was otherwise inaccessible by land while also assisting with 
search and rescue missions.53 While the CAP maintains operational control of 
                                            
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Observations on Costs, Benefits, 
and Challenges of a Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land 
Border: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on 
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51 United States Air Force, “Factsheets: Civil Air Patrol,” January 23, 2009, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101203103225/http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/
factsheet.asp?id=163.  
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53 Ibid.  
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their staff during mission deployments, they typically are an asset organized 
under ESF-1 in the SEOC.   
The CAP provides coverage in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands54 and can be activated at the request of the 
SEOC for local and state missions. The process for activating the CAP typically 
begins with a representative from the SEOC contacting the CAP alert officer or 
other designee to request mission support.55 As with the previous aircraft 
examples provided, there is a significant cost associated with CAP missions as 
the operational costs per hour were reportedly in excess of $130 per hour in 
2008.56 While the cost for CAP support is less than many current aerial support 
packages, it still represents a significant cost to the taxpayer.  
As previously noted, this thesis posits that an emergency management 
UAS program would enhance disaster response capabilities by providing 
emergency managers with additional options when coordinating the response to 
disasters. While a UAS program would not eliminate the need for other types of 
platforms, UAS deployments for missions such locating survivors, performing 
preliminary damage assessments, and environmental monitoring, offer 
emergency managers a safe and cost-effective resource that can be deployed 
more expeditiously than many traditional options.  
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III. COMPARISON OF UAS PROGRAMS 
An investment in knowledge pays the best interest. 
— Benjamin Franklin, founding father, author  
 
With the number of public agency UASs expected to balloon in the near 
future (see Figure 1), a comparison of existing UAS programs is necessary to 
assist in determining which elements of these programs may have cross-system 
applicability for disaster response missions. 
Figure 1.  DOD and Public Agency UAS Projected Use 2015–2035 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 
Service Demand 2015–2035 (Cambridge, MA: John A. Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center, 2013), 6. 
A. MILITARY SPECIFIC MISSIONS 
The use of UASs has traditionally had a military connotation given the 
prevalence of their deployment in numerous military-centric operations, and their 
modern-era use essentially beginning with the use of the Predator under the 
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CIA’s Lofty View program in 1994. Under the Lofty View program, the CIA used 
the GNAT-750 UAS to provide surveillance for NATO convoys and to locate 
Serbian artillery.57 These deployments were the first of what would become an 
extensive UAS program for the U.S. government.  
Six years later in 2000, MQ-1 Predators were deployed to eastern and 
southern Afghanistan to search for Osama Bin Laden. The CIA’s first reported 
targeted killing operation occurred approximately two years later in February 
2002 with the targeting in Afghanistan of a person suspected to be Bin Laden.58 
This mission represents a starting point for a significant increase in offensive 
UAS operations by the United States. The use of UASs for military purposes has 
continued to expand with the number of UAS strike missions flown under the 
Obama administration numbering nearly 500 as of October 2015.59 Even so, 
military UAS missions have not been solely offensive in nature as they continue 
to be deployed for multiple types of missions (e.g., reconnaissance). 
The military also deploys UASs for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions, including determining the location of improvised 
explosive devices and other hazards.60 These missions have traditionally been 
accomplished by UAS platforms such as the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and 
the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which are flown from locations around the world, 
including the continental United States (see Figure 2).61 While the CIA and U.S. 
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Air Force have performed the majority of UAS missions, the DOD is planning to 
assign a significant number of UAS missions to the U.S. Army due to expanding 
mission requests and requirements.62 The expansion of UAS mission 
assignments to the Army is significant as it indicates a plan for the continued, if 
not expanded, deployment of UASs in support of DOD missions.  
Figure 2.  Operational and Training Locations for U.S. Air Force UASs 
 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Force Actions Needed. 
While military UASs provide a critical resource at no cost to local and state 
governments, the timeframe to obtain UAS support from DOD assets, as noted 
previously, can be a lengthy process requiring a DSCA mission request to FEMA. 
While this process can proceed fairly rapidly, there is still be a significant delay in 
obtaining federal or military UAS support due to the time to initiate the mission 
request, mobilize, and deploy the resource, and for it to become operational on 
location. An expansion of DOD mission requests due to evolving operations in 
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the Middle East and Africa may also limit the availability of DOD UAS assets due 
to in-theater mission requirements outside the United States.63 While this void 
can potentially be filled by state National Guard UASs, the aforementioned 
February 17, 2015, memo from the DOD complicates the use of military assets 
for civilian disaster response because the domestic use of National Guard owned 
UASs requires the approval of the SecDef.64 This limits the ability of the state 
adjutant generals to order the immediate activation of a UAS(s) to support 
mission requests for aerial support from an SEOC. While the resource may be 
available more expeditiously than going through the DSCA process via FEMA 
and U.S. Northern Command, the requirement for SecDef approval prior to 
mission tasking and deployment significantly delays the use of National Guard 
controlled UAS assets within a given state.  
B. HOMELAND SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is the largest law 
enforcement agency within the DHS, first tested UASs for border patrol 
operations in 2004 with the first mission deployment of a CBP Predator UAS 
occurring in 2006.65 As of September 2013, the CBP fielded a fleet of 10 UASs 
to assist in patrolling more than 7,000 miles of land border and over 95,000 miles 
of maritime border, which is patrolled in collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG).66 Between 2011 and 2014, the UASs operated by the CBP logged over 
18,000 hours with approximately 80 percent of those hours occurring along 
border areas. The remaining flight hours during this timeframe were for training, 
transit, and disaster response missions.67 These numbers represent a robust 
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program that provides critical support to not only ground-based units operating 
along the border but local law enforcement and emergency management 
agencies as well.  
A UAS program the size of CBP’s is not free of controversy, including 
privacy trepidations over surveillance and collection operations as well as 
concerns about operational costs. While research did not indicate this as a 
conscious decision related to privacy, CBP operates its UASs at altitudes of 
between 19,000 and 28,000 feet, which prevents the identification of individuals 
or license plates.68 It is also important to note the UASs operated by CBP “do not 
have the capability [authority] to collect images from non-public areas, such as 
the interior of homes or businesses, or otherwise perform observations that 
would be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution.”69 Even though the CBP UASs assisted in the apprehension of 
2,525 people in 2013, as well rendered assistance to local law enforcement and 
disaster response missions, there are expressed concerns about the program 
costs, which have been reported to be in excess of $12,000 per hour.70 Although 
CBP does not pass along the operating costs to local and state governments for 
the support it provides for law enforcement and disaster response missions, the 
cost represents a significant taxpayer expense for a mission that can performed 
by more traditional aircraft or small UASs, which operate at a fraction of the cost. 
The USCG, which is also part of the DHS, is exploring the use of small 
UASs for ground and cutter-based operations.71 The use of small UASs by the 
USCG would represent a significant force-multiplier, increasing maritime 
awareness by providing potential threat and hazard information during routine 
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enforcement and boarding operations, as well as for environmental surveillance 
and search and rescue missions. While the USCG and CBP conduct joint 
operations out of port locations along the Gulf of Mexico,72 having access to 
hand-launched UASs would provide additional UAS options for the USCG that 
are more cost effective and more rapidly deployed than missions provided by 
CBP’s Predators. This would especially be the case along the coastline of the 
Atlantic Ocean and for Pacific Ocean operations around Hawaii and the U.S. 
Territories.  
While there has been a delay in the issuance of FAA regulations for 
government agencies, as of 2013 there were over a dozen local law enforcement 
agencies, including a total of 81 public entities, seeking FAA approval to operate 
a UAS in the United States (see Figure 3). The Michigan State Police (MSP) 
subsequently received FAA approval to operate in February 2015.73 The 
issuance of a COA to the MSP is noteworthy as it represents the first approval in 
the nation for the statewide deployment of a UAS for law enforcement operations 
and emergencies.74 The ability to deploy statewide allows for the MSP to assist 
multiple jurisdictions, unlike the remaining COAs issued to date for law 
enforcement agencies that have been limited to specific jurisdictional boundaries. 
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Figure 3.  Map of Domestic Drone Authorizations 
 
Source: “Law Enforcement Agencies Using Drones List, Map,” accessed October 
15, 2015, http://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/drones-state-local-
law-enforcement-agencies-license-list.html.  
The first recorded use of a UAS resulting in an arrest by a law 
enforcement agency in the United States occurred in North Dakota in 2011. At 
the request of local law enforcement, a U.S. CBP Predator UAS was used to 
determine the location of several suspects that had earlier brandished weapons 
in a standoff with local law enforcement. The use of the UAS was controversial 
as it was deployed without a formal policy in place concerning rules of 
engagement or privacy protections.75 While there were concerns about the lack 
of a formal policy outlining the use of a CBP UAS for local law enforcement 
mutual aid assistance, one must not forget or lose sight of the key concern of this 
mission, which was officer safety. In this case, the use of a CBP UAS facilitated a 
safe resolution of the incident with no injuries to the law enforcement officers or 
suspects.  
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The North Dakota incident offers one scenario in which UASs could be 
used by local, state, and/or federal law enforcement agencies. Other law 
enforcement situations where UASs could serve a valuable role include crash 
scene investigations and reconstruction, monitoring traffic flow during traffic jams 
and evacuations, hostage and barricaded subject situations, search and rescue 
operations, overhead security for national special security events (e.g., political 
party convention, presidential and foreign dignitary visits) and large gatherings 
such as concerts and sporting events. Additionally, UASs would serve as a 
valuable asset for correctional facilities by providing overhead surveillance for 
general security missions, such as fence security inspections; reducing 
contraband smuggling; monitoring large outside inmate gatherings and 
movements during meal times and recreation periods; as well as for disturbances 
or other prison emergencies.   
C. UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS COMPARISON 
In addition to the United States, two other nations, Australia and Canada, 
were selected for a review of the use of UASs in their respective countries 
because they have existing UAS regulations and legislation governing domestic 
operations. Due to rapidly emerging legislation, rules, and regulations, the review 
was not a comprehensive legal analysis but rather a review of the general 
provisions for use that were explored for applicability in the United States.  
1. United States  
The FAA administers the regulation of UASs in the United States. The 
primary function of the FAA as outlined in its mission statement is “is to provide 
the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.”76 More specifically, the 
FAA is responsible for the safe and efficient use of the NAS for both civilian and 
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military aircraft.77 This is somewhat unique in comparison to Canada, which 
separates the oversight of civilian and military aircraft. 
The operation of a UAS in the NAS of the United States by commercial or 
government entities requires an authorization from the FAA, which must be 
obtained prior to the commencement of flight operations. This authorization, or 
COA, can take upwards of 60 business days to obtain.78 One-time emergency 
COAs can be obtained for government agencies but the process of doing so can 
take upwards of 24 hours to obtain approval and authorization.79 For an 
emergency COA to be issued, the following conditions must apply: 
1. A situation exists that is defined as a condition of distress or 
urgency, where there is, or that has, the extreme possibility of loss 
of life, and  
2. The proponent has determined that manned flight operations 
cannot be conducted efficiently, and  
3. The proposed UAS is operating under a current approved COA for 
a different purpose or location.80  
Absent the above mentioned criteria, the request for a COA must follow 
the normal approval process, which as noted above, can take upwards of 60 
business days to obtain approval and authorization to operate.81 While this may 
be operationally sufficient for those law enforcement missions that are somewhat 
static (e.g., long-term surveillance), the current COA process significantly limits 
the ability of emergency responders to use UASs when responding to dynamic 
environments experienced during disasters (e.g., flash flooding, tornadoes), not 
to mention those law enforcement incidents that are more dynamic in nature 
(e.g., hostage situations).  
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There are currently two avenues through which to obtain FAA approval for 
the operation of a UAS in NAS of the United States. The first is “to obtain an 
experimental airworthiness certificate for private sector (civil) aircraft to do 
research and development, training and flight demonstrations. The second is to 
obtain a COA for public aircraft.”82 While the issuance of guidance and 
regulations for public agencies continues to experience delays in release and 
implementation, §334 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 directs 
the FAA to “develop and implement operational and certification requirements for 
the operation of public [UASs] in the [NAS]” by December 31, 2015.83 As with 
other congressionally mandated deadlines given to the FAA concerning UASs, 
this deadline was missed. It has been over three years since enactment of the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, yet minimal progress has been 
made in implementing operational and certification regulations for the UASs. This 
continues to hamper the implementation of UASs for both private and public 
organizations.  
In addition, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requires an 
agreement to be in place with public agencies for the operation of UASs weighing 
less than 4.4 pounds. The act stipulates UASs must operate via a direct line of 
sight with the operator, less than 400 feet above ground level (AGL), during 
daylight hours, within Class G airspace,84 and outside of five statute miles from 
any airport, heliport, seaplane base, spaceport, or other location with aviation 
activities.85 A subsequent agreement in May 2013 between the FAA and the U.S. 
Department of Justice expanded the maximum allowable weight for law 
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enforcement COAs from 4.4 to 25 pounds.86 The aforementioned stipulations 
must be met or the operation of a UAS by public agencies is not permissible 
unless the pilot in command (PIC) and visual observer meet the certification 
requirements outlined below and the agency in question has an approved COA.  
The current certification requirements established by the FAA, which are 
subject to change, specify a pilot certificate (e.g., airline transport, commercial, 
private, recreational, or sport pilot certificate) is required for both the PIC and 
visual observer for UAS flight operations conducted in controlled airspace (e.g., 
Class A, B, C, D, E) and uncontrolled airspace (e.g., Class G).87 Minimum pilot 
qualifications by airspace classification are listed in Figure 4. While a pilot 
certificate is currently required for controlled and uncontrolled airspace, a 
proposed FAA UAS rule, Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, would authorize the operation of a UAS in uncontrolled airspace 
without the requirement to obtain a pilot certificate as long as the PIC and visual 
observer have successfully completed the FAA Knowledge Test.88 Additionally, 
until such time formal UAS flight training is recommended or required by the 
FAA, PICs and visual observers should follow the training recommendations 
outlined by the UAS manufacturer.  
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Figure 4.  Airspace Classification 
 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, Instrument Flying Handbook (Oklahoma 
City, OK: Federal Aviation Administration, 2012), 1–3. 
When applying for a COA, information must be provided on the proponent, 
operational description, geographic location, system description, performance 
characteristics, air worthiness, procedures, avionics equipment, lights, 
communications, detection/surveillance capability, flight operation plan/maps, 
flight aircrew qualifications, and any special circumstances.89 Failing to provide 
this information in its entirety will result in a delay or denial of the COA. 
Additionally, the illegal operation of a UAS, including the failure to obtain a COA, 
can result in fines ranging from $1,000 to $25,000; however, in October 2015 the 
FAA recommended a record $1.9 million fine against a company that reportedly 
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conducted 65 unauthorized flights.90 As discussed in the subsequent sections for 
Australia and Canada, both nations have punitive processes in place similar to 
the United States for the unauthorized operation of a UAS.  
2. Australia 
Australia was the first nation to draft laws and legislation pertaining to the 
use of UASs for civil operations91 and, as such, offers a tenured policy and 
guidance structure for the use of UASs, which may be applicable in the United 
States.92 The structure and oversight of those regulations is administered by 
Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), whose primary function is to 
manage the safe regulation of civil air operations in Australia and the operation of 
Australian aircraft overseas.93 The operation of UASs in the Australian national 
airspace is broken into the categories of commercial and civil or hobbyist use, 
and each has a specific set of rules.94 For the purposes of this thesis, discussion 
is limited to the commercial and civil or hobbyist use and not international or 
overseas operations. 
The commercial use of UASs in Australia relates to any type of UAS use 
that is related to the operations of a private business. The CASA defines the 
commercial use of a UAS as actions a business may be taking related to its 
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operations.95 Commercial use of UASs in Australia requires a pilot to obtain an 
operator’s certificate, which validates the pilot’s ability to safely operate a UAS as 
well as pilot awareness of the rules and regulations for operating a UAS in 
Australia. In addition, approval from the CASA is required before a UAS can be 
legally operated in Australia.96 The flight approval process includes the filing of a 
flight plan and pilot certifications, with significant penalties for failing to file (e.g., 
fines, license revocation).97 As such, it is critical for pilots to follow standardized 
procedures much as they would when operating a rotary or fixed-winged aircraft.  
The use of a UAS by a government agency for disaster response, as an 
example, without obtaining CASA approval is at least theoretically possible as 
long as the platform weighs less than 2 kilograms (kg), remains below 400 AGL, 
and is not operated over populated areas.98 The deployment of a UAS weighing 
more than 2 kg, operating over 400 feet AGL, or over populated areas requires 
the issuance of an operating certificate (OC). Additionally, an operator certificate 
for the individual piloting the UAS is also required.99 This is similar to the 
requirement in the United States for a pilot certification to operate a UAS in 
controlled and uncontrolled airspace.100 While there is a comprehensive approval 
process in Australia to obtain an OC, it is not as stringent as the FAA 
requirements for UAS operators in the United States.   
In Australia, the issuance of an OC can take anywhere from days to 
months, depending on the complexity of the mission and the backlog in approval 
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process, with the current timeframe for approval projected at 10 months.101 
When submitting a request for an OC, the information that must be listed within 
the application includes: who may operate the UAS, the geographic operating 
area, operating altitudes, times/hours of operation, notification requirements, 
communication requirements, limitations and restrictions, and safety 
requirements.102 Failing to list this information will result in a delay or denial of 
the OC.  
When reviewing an OC application, the CASA must ensure the use of a 
UAS does not pose a greater risk than a comparable mission performed by a 
manned aircraft, including no significant safety risk to people or property. If 
deemed necessary, limitations can be imposed on the altitude, geographic 
area(s), and operational times of the UAS.103 Violations of UAS regulations can 
result in the issuance of fines or penalty units amounting to upwards of $9,000 
(50 penalty units, with one penalty unit equaling $180 as of July 2015).104 
Though it issues OCs, the CASA also has the authority to assess the fines, which 
are applicable to any pilot operating a UAS in Australian airspace.  
While Australia has a tenured experience with UAS policy and regulations, 
there are significant hurdles that impact the ability of government agencies to 
operate UASs in Australian air space. For example, the CASA requires 
governmental agencies to follow the same processes, regulations, and policies 
as commercial organizations. This process currently results in, as previously 
referenced, an approximate 10-month wait to receive an OC approval, which 
makes an emergency approval process for the use of UASs not practical unless 
operating a UAS under limiting conditions (e.g., less than 400 feet AGL, small 
size UASs).  
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3. Canada 
The regulation of UASs in Canada is administered by Transport Canada 
for civilian use and by the Canadian Department of National Defence for military 
applications, which is different from the U.S. policy of integrating the 
management of civil, commercial, and military aircraft under the FAA as part of 
an integrated NAS.105 For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on Canadian 
civilian applications, as it more directly relates to domestic disaster response 
operations.  
Transport Canada has the authority and responsibility of establishing and 
managing the safety and security standards for the operation of civilian aircraft, 
including UASs, in their airspace. This authority and responsibility includes not 
only private sector use but law enforcement and disaster response applications 
as well.106 This is an area of consistency for the Australia, Canada, and the 
United States as the CASA, Transport Canada, and FAA retain this authority and 
responsibility in their respective nations.  
For the operation of a UAS to be authorized, a Special Flight Operations 
Certificate (SFOC) must be issued by Transport Canada. The regulations used 
by Transport Canada to administer flight safety and security of civilian aircraft, 
both manned and unmanned, is found in the Canadian Aviation Regulations 
(CARs).107 Specific direction is provided in §602.41 of the CARs, which states, 
“no person shall operate an unmanned air vehicle in flight except in accordance 
with a[n] [SFOC], or an air operator certificate.”108 According to the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Currently in Canada there are no established 
standards…for pilot licensing, certification, maintenance, or command and 
control of UAVs [UASs].”109 This is a significant difference from the United 
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States, which, as previously mentioned, requires an airline transport, commercial, 
private, recreational or sport pilot certificate to operate a UAS in the NAS.110      
When Transport Canada issues an SFOC, the authorization, as the name 
implies, is for special cases and limited to a geographic area for a specific 
mission. The Regional Transport Canada General Aviation Office must receive 
requests for an SFOC at least 20 business days prior to the date of intended 
flight. Once issued, the SFOC can be used for essentially any civil application, 
including surveillance and disaster response. Information that must be listed 
within the application includes: 
The name, address, and where applicable, the telephone number 
and facsimile number of the applicant [and operations manager]; 
the type and purpose of the operation; the date and time of the 
operation; type and purpose of the operation; description of the 
aircraft; security plans and emergency contingency plans; and a 
detailed plan describing how the operation will be carried out 
including: altitude and routes where the operation will be carried 
out; the location of any obstacles; and the exact boundaries of the 
area” where the operation will be conducted.111  
Failing to list this information on an SFOC application will, as with an OC 
application in Australia, result in a delay or denial of the application. 
Though issued on a case-by-case basis, SFOCs can be approved for 
long-term use under a blanket authority to operate. Blanket authorities for a 
defined area can be issued for a specific timeframe if the mission and location of 
the flight remain unchanged.112 While these parameters are operationally 
sufficient for law enforcement missions that are somewhat static (e.g., 
surveillance), they limit the ability of emergency managers to respond to the 
dynamic environments experienced during disasters (e.g., flash flooding, 
tornadoes).   
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While Transport Canada has essentially excluded model aircraft from 
regulation, the CARs make a clear distinction between model aircraft and UASs. 
That clear distinction is that model aircraft must be used for recreational 
purposes only and weigh less than 35 kg. If a model aircraft is used for non-
recreational purposes (e.g., disaster response) and/or exceed 35 kg, it is 
considered a UAS and can only operate under an SFOC unless its use is 
consistent with a November 2014 exemption issued by Transport Canada 
permitting the operation of small UASs without an SFOC.113 Failing to obtain an 
SFOC can result in a fine of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for corporations/
organizations.114 While these penalties are substantial, Canada is more lenient 
overall in comparison to both Australia and the United States concerning current 
operational limitations on UASs. 
As noted previously, there is some leniency in Canada for the operation of 
UASs as “there are no established standards for pilot licensing, certification, 
maintenance, or command and control.”115 Additionally, the aforementioned 
November 2014 exemption permits the operations of a UAS without an SFOC as 
long as the UAS weighs less than 2 kg and the operator complies with the listed 
exemption criteria (e.g., operations must be at or below 300 feet AGL). The 
operation of a UAS with a weight between 2.1 kg and 25 kg is permissible 
without an SFOC as long as Transport Canada is notified.116 These exemptions 
are significant and indicate a progressive UAS environment for both the 
government and private sector use of UASs in Canada and are worthy of 
consideration for application in the United States.  
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D. COMPARATIVE PROGRAMS ANALYSIS 
Based on a comparison of the UAS programs currently in place for the 
United States, Australia, and Canada, as well as a review of military, homeland 
security and law enforcement programs, there is significant room for 
improvement in the United States if UASs are going to be deployed to any 
significant degree. While the United States is, as noted, recognized as a world 
leader in UAS technology, the U.S. policy for civilian and public agency use is so 
restrictive that the domestic use of UAS is significantly limited.  
Limitations in place for both the United States and Australia hinder the use 
of UAS by governmental organizations as the approval process for their 
operation is the same, or similar, to the processes in place for commercial use. 
By applying the same or similar process to governmental agency approvals as 
they do commercial or civilian approvals, the existing FAA procedures force 
governmental agencies, in many cases, to either skirt the official approval 
process by using other platform options, such as tethered UASs; operate a UAS 
without authorization; rely on volunteer hobbyists to provide UAS coverage; 
continue to use more expensive resources, such as rotary and/or fixed-winged 
aircraft; or obtain federal UAS support via the FEMA mission assignment process 
(i.e., DSCA support) for those incidents warranting federal government 
resources. 
While it is recognized that a pre-deployment training program or 
certification for government agency UAS operators is necessary for liability 
purposes and to build operational skills, that training or certification should not 
present a significant burden to the agencies that are implementing a UAS 
program. However, the stipulation for government agency UAS operators to 
possess an airline transport, commercial, private, recreational, or sport pilot 
certificate does exactly that as it creates costly and labor intensive requirements 
that are prohibitive for many organizations. This is especially the case for many 
local law enforcement, fire, and, more specifically for the purposes of this thesis, 
emergency management agencies. Aside from the additional costs to complete 
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the training necessary to obtain an airline transport, commercial, private, 
recreational, or sport pilot certificate, the costs to hire and maintain qualified UAS 
pilots creates a burden that should be re-evaluated, especially for small UASs.  
As noted previously, Canada does not require a license or an SFOC for 
small UASs in the 2.2 kg to 25 kg range. While it is recognized that a requisite 
level of training should be required for operational and liability purposes, it would 
be prudent for the United States to implement a similar provision in the United 
States for government agencies, even if such a provision was limited to UASs 
weighing five pounds or less. In doing so, it would allow local and state 
emergency management agencies to rapidly deploy a small UAS to, among other 
missions, determine the impact of a disaster, obtain SA as part of the 




IV. POTENTIAL USES OF UASS FOR EMERGENCY AND 
DISASTER RESPONSE MISSIONS 
If everybody is thinking alike, then somebody isn’t thinking. 
— General George S. Patton, Jr., U.S. Army 
 
Before developing policies, procedures, and a programmatic structure for 
an emergency management UAS program, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the potential uses of UASs for disaster response missions. 
Agencies and organizations should not develop a UAS program merely for the 
sake of doing so. Finn and Wright explain, “UASs have a niche in performing the 
three D’s: dull, dirty, and dangerous work.”117 Additionally, Brecher offers that 
UASs “can be deployed on demand…have flexibility in tasking…have plug and 
play capabilities for their payloads…can support high—resolution 
cameras…[and] can cover remote areas.”118 Having an understanding of the 
potential uses offered by UASs would assist in objectively identifying areas 
where UASs can augment current capabilities.  
This author posits that UASs may be particularly well-suited for local and 
regional emergency management programs and can enhance the state-level 
support to local government agencies during disasters. For example, recognizing 
the need to deploy resources as quickly as possible in the aftermath of a 
disaster, initiatives, such as the state of Ohio’s 4/72 Project, are intended to 
rapidly deploy resources as part of a coordinated response to disasters. The 
intent of Ohio’s 4/72 Project is to provide essential resources within four hours of 
an incident and reflects a shift in the emergency management paradigm that will 
enhance the state’s ability to respond to disasters quicker and more efficiently 
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than at any time in Ohio history. The program is sustainable for 72 hours and 
focuses on providing critical needs, such as water, food, baby formula, blankets, 
and generators to help emergency managers assist their communities during 
disasters.119 The 4/72 Project represents an opportunity for UASs to assist in 
determining the preliminary impact of the disaster, as an indicator of increased 
need, and the status of roadways for transporting critical needs items. 
An advantage offered by UASs in comparison to rotary and fixed-winged 
aircraft is their ability to obtain unique observation angles that are not practical or 
otherwise possible via conventional means. As shown in Table 1, UASs can or 
have been used for conducting agricultural inspections, assessing critical 
infrastructure (e.g., bridges, oil and gas pipelines, power transmission lines), 
conducting confined space inspections, detecting wildfires, determining building 
and structural integrity, determining COP and SA, conducting environmental 
monitoring and sampling (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological), developing 
geo-mapping products (e.g., overhead maps), conducting aerial reconnaissance, 
conducting search and rescue operations, conducting structural firefighting 
operations (e.g., determining location of victims, deploying fire retardant via 
larger UASs), and transporting medical supplies and equipment (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, AEDs).  
Table 1.   Potential Emergency Management Related UAS Missions 
Agricultural Inspections Determine COP/SA 
Assessing Critical Infrastructure Environmental Monitoring/Sampling 
Confined Space Inspections Geo-Mapping 
Damage Assessments Reconnaissance 
Detecting Wildfires Search and Rescue Operations 
Determine Building/Structural Integrity Transporting Medical Supplies 
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Collapsed buildings pose an especially hazardous situation for responders 
due to the instability of the structure. UASs provide an alternative to sending 
responders into an unstable building environment, and they can ascertain the 
status of a structure with the added benefit of being able to provide real-time 
audio/video and environmental air sampling. Not only does there appear to be an 
emerging interest in using small UASs for structural assessments, but, as noted 
by Duncan, and Murphy, experiments have indicated that small UASs have been 
able to enter the hot zone of a contaminated area and begin transmitting usable 
data within 16 minutes. This timeframe is significantly faster than what can be 
accomplished by a traditional hazardous materials (HazMat) or radiation 
monitoring team.120 The data gathered during these experiments is a critical 
observation as not only was the UAS able to perform the assessments without 
placing responders in a hazardous situation, it was able to provide critical 
environmental information to incident command staff more expeditiously. This is 
yet another example of how UASs can augment incident response when 
operations are not limited by bureaucratic restrictions, such as the 
aforementioned requirement to obtain a COA from the FAA prior to mission 
deployment for disaster and life safety missions.   
Critical infrastructure inspections (e.g., bridges, oil and gas pipelines, 
power transmission lines) are often conducted via an aerial assessment by 
conventional fixed and rotary-winged aircraft or by physical inspection. Bridge 
inspections, for instance, are expensive, time-consuming, and dangerous. With 
the exception of non-redundant bridge trusses, for which the Federal Highway 
Administration requires a hands-on inspection, using UASs for bridge inspections 
would compress the time it takes to complete inspections, reduce lane closures, 
reduce costs, and more importantly, would be safer.121 While the capability to 
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perform transportation infrastructure inspections represents a significant benefit 
in day-to-day operations, it is critical for disaster response missions. This is 
especially the case in the aftermath of an explosion, flood, hurricane, or 
earthquake, due to the immediate need to re-open highways for ingress and 
egress into the areas impacted by the incident.     
Oil and gas incidents pose a unique challenge for field monitoring teams 
due to the volatility of the products extracted from the wells. Currently, oil and 
gas companies use either handheld detectors or helicopters to detect methane 
leaks. Aside from the cost of these systems, they require the operator or pilot to 
operate dangerously close to the well pad to obtain readings or confirmation of a 
methane or other volatile chemical release.122 With over 500,000 hydraulically 
fractured gas wells in the United States, UASs present a potential industry-wide 
method that would be provide a less expensive and safer option for conducting 
air monitoring than what is currently available via conventional means.123 From 
an emergency response perspective, UASs would serve as a valuable resource 
during well pad incidents due to their rapid deployability; however, their use 
would require an exemption for operation in incidents where a no fly zone has 
been established.  
Wildland fires present challenges for firefighters in not only fire 
suppression but also in the development of SA/COP for the incident. Similar to 
other incidents, such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, landslides, and building 
collapses, UASs can provide valuable awareness than can aid response efforts 
by identifying areas where suppression efforts need to be expanded. Moreover, 
the future may very well bode the introduction of UASs deploying fire retardant. 
However, a more important role for UASs may arguably be in the detection of 
wildland fires before they significantly expand. 
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A team of researchers is currently working on a project called Fire 
Urgency Estimator in Geosynchronous Orbit (FUEGO), which would serve as an 
early detection system for wildland fires.124 The ongoing drought in the western 
United States has extended the wildland fire season and, as such, reinforces the 
need for an early detection system such as FUEGO. The early warning system 
comprising FUEGO  
would consist of infrared cameras mounted on drones and piloted 
aircraft…plus another camera on a satellite. The cameras would 
snap photos…[and] a computer would then subtract recent photos 
from new ones of the same area, and by looking at the difference 
be able to tell when a new fire has erupted.125  
While FUEGO is still its infancy, it is an example of how a UAS-based 
sensor system may be deployed in the future to provide for the rapid, pinpoint 
detection of wildland fires. Such pinpoint accuracy would result in firefighters 
being able to respond more expeditiously to wildland fires that may otherwise go 
undetected for a significant amount of time.  
The use of UASs also represents a force multiplier for those fire 
departments that deploy an air reconnaissance chief (ARC) during fire response 
operations. As an example, the current policy of the Fire Department City of New 
York (FDNY) is to have a battalion chief, operating as the ARC, deploy 
automatically for high-rise business and residential fires, as well as for building 
collapses.126 The activation of an ARC can also occur for multiple alarm fires, 
weapons of mass destruction incidents, special events, and for incidents 
spanning large geographic areas that are otherwise inaccessible.127 The role of 
the ARC is to provide an overhead scene assessment (e.g., imminent hazards, 
structural integrity, location(s) of building occupants) to the incident commander 
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(IC) on the ground.128 This assessment is critically important to the IC as it will 
assist with guiding the priorities, objectives, strategy, and tactics comprising the 
incident action plan.   
Since FDNY does not have a helicopter in its inventory, the New York 
Police Department (NYPD) provides air support for FDNY on an as requested 
and available basis. While NYPD is uniquely equipped to provide the support 
necessary, it is not always timely due to travel time and conflicting missions, 
which in turn wastes valuable response time.129 Additionally, when deployed for 
aerial support, a battalion chief, who would otherwise be available to respond to 
another incident, or fill a command and general staff position within the ICP, is 
not available. To address this issue, whether within the FDNY or other fire 
departments, the deployment of a UAS would decrease the time necessary to 
obtain an on-scene assessment or SA, thereby expediting the sharing of incident 
information (e.g., live video feed, telemetry) with the ICP and EOC.  
Whether updating flood maps or geo-mapping an area before and after a 
disaster, the reconnaissance and mapping capabilities afforded by UASs offer 
emergency managers and first responders a valuable resource that can assist 
with not only day-to-day operations but disaster response and emergency 
operations as well. UASs offer a rapidly deployable resource that can provide live 
video feeds to ICPs and EOCs. While having this level of access to a disaster 
scene provides a level of granularity not traditionally available to many incident 
commanders, a study by McGuirl, Sarter, and Wood reveals that having access 
to live imaging data can cause data from other sources (e.g., field reports, 
dispatch information) to be overlooked. Such an oversight can negatively impact 
operations by not completely factoring all data sources into command staff 
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decision-making processes.130 While the results of the study could be an 
anomaly, the key takeaway is the criticality for command staff to not develop 
tunnel vision by focusing on a single data source. Nonetheless, ICPs and EOCs 
should take advantage of all available data sources to assist in obtaining SA/
COP as they develop response strategies for responding to a given disaster or 
emergency situation. 
Search and rescue operations are particularly well-suited for small UASs 
as operations often occur in densely populated areas or confined space 
environments. As a case in point, in July 2014, an amateur UAS operator was 
able to locate an elderly missing adult in a heavily wooded area in Virginia. The 
man had been missing for three days and previous searches involving first 
responders, search canines, a helicopter, and hundreds of volunteers on foot had 
failed to locate him. Not only was the UAS operator able to locate the missing 
man, the operator was able to locate him within approximately 20 minutes of 
deployment.131 A significant point to note in this instance is the reliance on the 
general public to provide a UAS to search for the missing man due to FAA 
restrictions, which limit the use of UASs by governmental agencies and 
commercial organizations.  
Other search and rescue missions that can be performed by UASs include 
searching for survivors from flash floods and mountain rescues. Two recent 
incidents in Texas saw the use of a UAS assist first responders during flash flood 
rescue missions. In the first incident, a volunteer UAS operator, using a search 
light payload, guided responders to the location of a truck that had been swept 
away by flash flooding. In the second incident, the same UAS operator was able 
to transport a rescue rope to people stranded in a mobile home that was 
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otherwise inaccessible by boat. Subsequently, the residents were provided with 
life preservers and rescued via helicopter lift.132 In both instances, a UAS 
assisted responders in rescuing flood victims that may have perished otherwise.  
While one could assert that an emergency COA could have been obtained 
for the emergency situations noted above, the fact remains a civilian hobbyist 
was able to provide a service that could not be readily obtained by government or 
commercial agencies. This case serves as one of several instances where a 
civilian hobbyist has been able to render assistance by employing UASs, while 
government agencies remain handcuffed by overly restrictive bureaucratic FAA 
rules and regulations. The interpretation espoused by the FAA, that a UAS 
operated by a civilian hobbyist is not an aircraft but one operated by a 
government agency is, represents a clear contradiction in logic that must be 
addressed if UASs are going to be used to their full potential. Chapter V reviews 
and analyzes other barriers that pose challenges for agencies looking to 
establish a UAS program.  
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V. BARRIERS IMPACTING FORMAL INTEGRATION OF UASS 
INTO DISASTER RESPONSE 
If you don’t know what your barriers are, it’s impossible to figure out 
how to tear them down.  
— John Manning, author 
 
There are many barriers that may limit the ability of agencies and 
jurisdictions to implement a UAS program for domestic use. Examples of these 
barriers include: concerns about privacy and Fourth Amendment protections 
afforded under the U.S. Constitution; connotations that UASs are primarily 
military, law enforcement, or homeland security platforms; limitations on use 
posed by FAA rules and regulations; and potential ethical concerns pertaining to 
UAS manufacturers due to an association of their brand name with military or 
surveillance applications. 
Data from the aforementioned 2013 Monmouth University poll suggests 
there is significant concern among the general public in the United States 
regarding privacy protections from government intrusion.133 For example, 
information from the poll concerning the domestic operation of UASs in the 
United States discovered that 80 percent of the respondents voiced privacy 
concerns for law enforcement missions using high resolution cameras.134 This 
data indicates a significant challenge for both law enforcement and emergency 
management agencies as the general public cannot necessarily determine 
whether a mission is surveillance or disaster response related. Unless the intent 
of the mission is clearly delineated, segments of the general public may assume 
the UAS is conducting a surveillance mission, which many may consider an 
invasion of privacy.  
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Opponents to the use of UASs by government agencies argue that privacy 
protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution limit 
the use of UASs and thereby their use by the government constitutes a civil 
rights violation; however, neither the Fourth Amendment nor the U.S. 
Constitution directly address the right to privacy.135 Additionally, as stated by 
Ison, Terwilliger, and Vincenzi, “The range of [U.S.] Supreme Court and lower 
court decisions that set the precedent for privacy assurances have dictated that 
short-term aerial surveillance does not constitute a search in terms of the 
Constitution.”136 This is a noteworthy observation considering privacy concerns 
are not only reflected in poll numbers137 but in incidents, such as the previously 
noted landslide in Oso, WA, in which a UAS mission was reportedly canceled 
due to potential privacy concerns regarding photos or video that would be taken 
during mission deployments.138 As such, it is critical for agencies and 
jurisdictions to proactively market their UAS programs for their humanitarian 
benefits and ensure provisions are in place to address privacy concerns.  
Interestingly enough, similar concerns and limitations are typically not 
points of contention when missions are conducted via conventional platforms, 
such as fixed and rotary-winged aircraft. This begs the question of why is there a 
perceived difference between the use of conventional aircraft and UASs. While 
some argue that the use of UASs domestically poses no more of an invasion of 
privacy or ethical concern than those posed by conventional rotary or fixed-
winged aircraft, these aircraft, as opposed to a UAS, allow a person, due to the 
noise exhibited by the aircraft, “to take measures to keep private those activities 
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that they do not wish to expose to public view.”139 An additional concern 
expressed by Finn and Wright is a term they refer to as “function creep,” whereby 
a UAS that is intended for a specific purpose (e.g., disaster response) expands to 
include an additional function (e.g., monitoring an area for criminal indicators).140 
Finn and Wright further advocate that the insufficiency of current legislation 
governing the domestic use of UASs has a disparate effect on marginalized 
populations.141 Potential ethical areas such as this, as well as the 
aforementioned concerns that may be found among marginalized populations, do 
pose challenges, actual or perceived, and will continue to impact the use of 
UASs domestically. As such, these concerns should be considered as part of any 
program policy.  
Nonetheless, absent varying state legislation, the aforementioned 
February 2015 presidential memorandum issued by President Obama and 
limited or outdated rules and regulations from the FAA, indicate that privacy is an 
area that needs to be addressed as there is no central national standard for UAS 
privacy controls. This observation is also advanced by Ison, Terwilliger, and 
Vincenzi who posit, “The lack of initiative to impose specific privacy restrictions or 
controls over UAS operations by the FAA opens the door to federal, state, and 
local entities imposing their own rules and regulations.”142 However, applying a 
double-standard to UASs in comparison to ground-based and other conventional 
aerial reconnaissance platforms is counterproductive. While privacy concerns 
must be considered and respected, they should not limit the use of UASs for 
disaster response missions due to the potential lifesaving aspects of those 
mission deployments.  
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Another barrier presenting challenges for the domestic use of UASs is the 
connotation fostered by some segments of the population who assert the use of 
UASs is primarily militaristic, law enforcement or homeland security centric and 
represents a threat to the United States. While the validity of this connotation can 
be debated, the associated perceptions and concerns inhibit the widespread use 
of UASs by government agencies for humanitarian missions such as disaster 
response. Whether public opinion is responsible for the delay in the issuance of 
FAA rules and regulations is not possible to determine. However, such an impact 
would not be unheralded and is noted by the Aerospace Industries Association 
(AIA), which suggests,  
As with any emerging technology, public opinion regarding these 
systems often begins in the imagination, and may harden into myth 
through misconception, popular culture and an inability to imagine 
the non-military benefits of a platform that has traditionally been 
used for national defense.143  
While some may believe it is relatively easy to debunk these myths and 
perceptions or to disavow them as an evanescent opinion, the reality is not that 
simple.  
With recent reports of UASs disrupting wildfire response operations,144 
encroaching on air space near airports,145 breaching the fence line at the White 
House,146 and publicized concerns about the use of UASs for acts of 
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terrorism,147 segments of the population in the United States, and other nations 
for that matter, exude varying levels of apprehension concerning the domestic 
use of UASs. To assist in mitigating many of the myths and connotations 
surrounding the use of UASs for domestic missions, agencies should consider a 
public awareness and education program outlining the benefits of their use. This 
awareness and education program should not be a short-term initiative but rather 
a structured, formal component to any governmental agency UAS program.  
While giving due consideration to privacy concerns and public 
perceptions, limitations on UAS use posed by FAA rules and regulations are 
arguably the greatest hurdle currently limiting their domestic use in the United 
States. As noted previously, while processes for emergency requests exist, the 
60-day timeframe to obtain a non-emergency COA for government agencies 
desiring to deploy UASs for disaster response missions represents an extremely 
high level of bureaucracy. Congress and the FAA have been shortsighted in their 
approach to establishing UASs rules and regulations as the FAA Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012 places, or at least appears to place, a higher emphasis 
on approving civilian operations than public or governmental agency use.148 The 
argument can be made that the development of government agency rules and 
regulations should have been given the highest priority. However, the fact 
remains that the FAA has repeatedly missed congressionally mandated 
deadlines outlined in the act, including the recent September 30, 2015 deadline 
to develop civil use rules and regulations.149 As expected with missing 
congressionally mandated deadlines, there has been an increasingly vocal outcry 
from Congress, as well as public and private sector organizations, to finalize the 
UAS rules and regulations. 
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The missed deadlines were not necessarily unexpected, as a 2014 U.S. 
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General report noted the FAA 
would miss the established deadlines due to “significant technological barriers, 
including detection and standardized air traffic procedures and other issues.”150 
However, in all fairness, a review of UAS platforms operating in 2013 noted there 
were 270 companies worldwide that were manufacturing no less than 960 distinct 
types of UASs, including 144 in the United States alone.151 These numbers have 
assuredly increased since 2013, which presents challenges for air traffic 
controllers regarding the necessary spectrum allocations necessary for operating 
UASs in the NAS.152 While the potential hazards posed by UASs in the NAS is 
recognized, the fact remains that UASs represent a viable and effective tool that 
can be used by emergency management organizations during disasters. 
Therefore, the FAA needs to expedite the approval of the rules and regulations 
governing their use by governmental agencies. However, as previously noted, 
these rules and regulations cannot be so stringent that they stifle the expansion 
of the domestic use of UASs for disaster response.  
Ethical considerations pose a potential barrier concerning the domestic 
use of UASs in the United States. Disasters do not discriminate based on 
nationality, race, gender, or socio-economic status, yet they often impact 
populations that may consider their in-group to be marginalized within a given 
society. As a result, the use of UASs, regardless of whether disaster response 
related or not, may present a perceived risk of discrimination due to 
apprehension about the intent of the UAS mission due to its governmental nexus. 
This may especially be the case concerning the capturing and retention of aerial 
photos or video. Therefore, as noted by Finn and Wright, “it is essential for [UAS] 
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operators to enact information sharing practices to provide members of the public 
with knowledge about the specific activities being undertaken.”153 A failure to do 
so only serves to perpetuate misinformation that may permeate the public 
perception concerning the domestic use of UASs.  
As noted previously, Gilman offers an interesting ethical concern by 
commenting, “The military remains the largest user of UAVs [UASs], while the 
manufacturers are primarily military contractors. This situation raises ethical and 
operational considerations for humanitarian organizations, who may not wish to 
be associated even indirectly with military actors.”154 Steen Mogensen, chief 
executive officer of Scion UAS, recognizes a potential issue with UASs and their 
association with military applications, as he notes the term drone “strikes fear into 
a lot of people.”155 Conversely, Nelson Paez, who is the CEO of DreamHammer, 
a UAS software development company, dismisses potential ethical concerns for 
companies such as his, by noting they are no more responsible for the use of 
their product than Microsoft is for the use of their various products.156 Paez’s 
statement is consistent with existing research data, which does not indicate 
support of the opinion posited by Gilman. However, it should be noted that for the 
purposes of this thesis, research on this topic was primarily limited to the United 
States and does not address potential ethical concerns in nations that have seen 
significant military UAS operations (e.g., Afghanistan, Pakistan).  
Another barrier to implementing a domestic UAS program, whether for 
emergency management or other domestic missions (e.g., law enforcement), is 
the haste in which some governmental agencies have rushed to implement a 
UAS program. Hastily implementing a UAS program without having vetted plans 
and procedures in place, as well as sufficient funding, and failing to obtain public 
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support from the affected citizenry are areas that will quickly derail a program 
before it is implemented.  
Two examples of hastily implemented UAS programs, which were 
subsequently canceled after the procurement of UASs, occurred in the state of 
Washington. The Seattle Police Department (PD) previously purchased two 
UASs; however, the program was reportedly canceled after a public outcry by the 
general public and a lack of support from city council and the mayor’s office.157 In 
another instance, the King County, WA, Sheriff’s Office returned a UAS it had 
obtained from Seattle PD due to what the sheriff noted as a failure to do its 
“homework” before accepting the UAS.158 A similar example is noted in the state 
of Texas where the Department of Public Safety canceled its UAS program due 
to operational issues.159 After spending $295,000 on two UASs, it was 
determined the UASs not only lacked the design to operate in the rocky terrain in 
many parts of Texas, they did not function well in high winds.160 These examples 
highlight the unintended consequences of implementing a UAS program prior to, 
in the case of Seattle, obtaining public and elected official support, and, in the 
case of Texas, failing to research system design requirements prior to 
procurement.  
The last barrier explored as part of this thesis is the difficulty in obtaining 
initial funding to procure a UAS(s) and issues pertaining to UAS program 
sustainment costs. Funding for UASs is theoretically available under the U.S. 
DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) via the State Homeland 
Security Program (SHSP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants, and the 
Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), as UASs are on the 
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Approved Equipment List (AEL). However, FEMA has recently temporarily halted 
the funding for UASs pending the implementation of recommendations by the 
White House Law Enforcement Working Group, established as a result of 
Executive Order 13688.161 A general notice recognizing the temporary stay in 
UAS funding authorizations under the aforementioned grant programs is 
annotated on the AEL.162 While it is unfortunate that FEMA has taken this 
position, this was not unexpected due to the delays by the FAA in issuing UAS 
rules and regulations for governmental organizations. As a result of the 
temporary suspension in funding authorizations for UASs by FEMA, departments 
that were in the process of procuring and implementing a UAS program have 
either been forced to cease the implementation of UAS programs or locate other 
funding sources.  
While the current stay on using EMPG, SHSP, or UASI funds for UAS 
procurement and/or sustainment presents challenges, some agencies have used 
alternate funding sources and donations to fund their UAS program. For 
example, the Medina County, Ohio (OH) Sheriff’s Office received two UASs from 
a local vendor who was interested in obtaining a law enforcement perspective as 
it developed its product line.163 By partnering with a private sector entity, the 
Medina County Sheriff’s Office was able to implement a UAS program that may 
not have been feasible otherwise due to budgetary restraints.  
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With a lack of funding posing a significant barrier for implementing a UAS 
program in many cases, this thesis encourages departments to consider the 
procurement of small UASs as a means to mitigate or reduce this barrier. Small 
UASs weighing less than 5 pounds (2.2 kg), are significantly less expensive, and 
are more rapidly deployable than larger UASs, which is an area of consideration 
when developing a UAS program. There are limitations with small UASs, which 
are discussed in the decision guide in Appendix A; yet, they may prove to be the 
most viable option for local agencies and organizations developing a UAS 
program.  
Lastly, it is worth noting that while FEMA is awaiting the implementation of 
recommendations by the White House Law Enforcement Working Group, law 
enforcement is but one component of a domestic UAS program. Failing to 
recognize this limits the use of UASs by what is arguably FEMA’s largest 
constituency— local and state emergency management agencies. The lack of 
recognition afforded emergency management as a significant component of the 
domestic UAS community is not limited to federal agencies or executive orders, 
but it is also reflected in state legislation and local ordinances as well.  
Chapter VI of this thesis references state legislation pertaining to UASs in 
the states of Alaska, Illinois, North Dakota, and Tennessee. In each instance, the 
UAS legislation focuses on a law enforcement perspective, not those for disaster 
response. While research did not determine a clear conclusion as to why that is 
the case, it may be due to law enforcement missions having more public 
recognition and concern about their use. Nonetheless, recognition of emergency 
management as an equal constituent in the UAS community is critical for public 
safety. Local ordinances, state legislation, executive orders, and FAA rules and 
regulations should recognize the criticality of UASs for disaster response 
missions by including processes to expedite their implementation into the NAS.  
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VI. POLICY AND PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS FOR A 
DISASTER RESPONSE UAS PROGRAM 
Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for 
granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.  
— Francis Bacon, English philosopher and statesman 
 
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
For those agencies and organizations looking to establish a UAS program, 
executive level buy-in is critical to the establishment and success of the program. 
Without buy-in from the chief executives and elected officials of the jurisdiction, 
there is little use to proceed with implementing a UAS program as executive 
support is required to sustain the program. Therefore, it is critical to provide 
comprehensive programmatic information to senior officials so they can make an 
informed decision when considering a UAS program. 
Critical information for any agency or organization considering a UAS 
program includes having an understanding of the following: information needs, a 
historical perspective of the conventional methods used in aerial missions for 
disaster response, an awareness of comparative programs, potential uses of 
UASs for disaster response, and barriers impacting the formal integration of 
UASs into the NAS for disaster response missions. Assuming for the purposes of 
this thesis that a decision has been made to implement a UAS program, the 
agency or jurisdiction should first develop a policy that outlines the parameters of 
the program before procuring a UAS and/or formally establishing a program. 
Currently, there is no standardized national format for a UAS program policy, but 
there are certainly general topic areas that should be addressed as part of a 
formal policy.164 Though not entirely inclusive, these topics are detailed below. 
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Recognizing public concerns regarding the use of UASs by law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies, the purpose section of the policy 
should reinforce the humanitarian nature of the program and reinforce its benefit 
to public safety. The purpose section should also discuss why a UAS program is 
to be implemented by the agency or jurisdiction. Additionally, due to the 
aforementioned barriers concerning privacy and surveillance, it would be 
beneficial to specifically reference the policy is for an emergency management 
UAS program. The purpose section of the policy should also reference 
compliance with FAA rules and regulations and reinforce safeguarding the 
privacy of the general public. 
The definitions section of the policy is important as it identifies key 
positions and terms that are applicable to the program. Many of the terms, such 
as the PIC, visual observer, sensor/payload operator, AGL, and visual flight rules 
are identified in the COA issued by the FAA while other terms and positions (e.g., 
flight leader), though general in nature, will be defined by the agency or 
jurisdiction. Any terms referenced in the policy should be noted in this section of 
the policy to ensure the use of standard terminology within the UAS program.  
The aircraft section of the policy should specifically address the type(s) of 
UAS(s) that will be used by the agency or jurisdiction. At a minimum, the topics 
that should be included in this section of the policy include general airworthiness, 
maintenance, maintenance logs, training (both pre-service and ongoing in-
service), radio frequencies that will be used, storage, transportation, pre-flight 
preparation (e.g., charging batteries, initiating power source), post-flight recovery, 
and approved payload (e.g., camera, environmental sensors). This information is 
critical as it establishes many of the basic elements that form the foundation of a 
UAS program. 
In addition to noting the specifications of the UAS(s) operated under the 
program, the specifications section of the policy should include provisions noting 
the UAS may not under any circumstances be armed with lethal or less lethal 
weapons. The FAA has traditionally opined that laws related to local and state 
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law enforcement “are not subject to federal regulation,”165 although the previous 
director of the FAA’s UAS Integration Office stated the current FAA rules “would 
prohibit weapons from being installed on a civil aircraft.”166 While there is 
pending legislation in Tennessee affirming such a prohibition against the 
attachment of weapons to a UAS, this exclusion would not apply to local, state, 
or federal law enforcement agencies.167 Conversely, the state of North Dakota 
has enacted legislation prohibiting the arming of all UASs with lethal weapons; 
however, the legislation does not specifically prohibit the use of less lethal 
weapons (e.g., Tasers, bean bag rounds, pepper spray).168 The topic of arming 
UASs in the NAS of the United States is a controversial topic, which highlights 
the need for an emergency management UAS program policy explicitly 
prohibiting the weaponizing of UASs.  
Cyber security is a critical area necessitating inclusion in the agency or 
jurisdiction’s UAS policy and standard operating procedures (SOPs). This is 
supported by Spirik, who asserts that many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
UASs lack the technological maturity necessary to prohibit cyber intrusion.169 To 
address the cyber threat posed to UASs, researchers from the University of 
Virginia and the Georgia Institute of Technology developed the System-Aware 
Secure Sentinel system.170 During flight tests, researchers were able to detect 
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and mitigate cyber-attacks, thereby restoring full flight operations to the UAS.171 
As technology continues to evolve, the development of a variety of cyber 
protection systems is expected, much like what exists today with virus protection 
security packages for computers and smartphones. In recognition of the 
implications of cyber hacking, provisions should be in place to prevent the 
compromise of UAS mission information and the commandeering of UASs by a 
third party. In addition to incorporating cyber security provisions into UAS policies 
and SOPs, UAS programs should conduct routine preparedness exercises to 
validate the cyber security of their program.     
The PIC section of the policy should address the pilot rating requirements, 
initial and in-service training and certification requirements, ongoing/re-
certification requirements, flight requirements, and physical requirements. These 
topical areas are not only required by the FAA, but they also are necessary from 
a liability perspective as they provide the competencies that are required to 
operate a UAS within the parameters of the agency UAS program. As with any 
perishable skill, it is critical for the pilots to maintain their flying proficiency, and a 
minimum number of flight events should be identified as a monthly or annual 
requirement.  
As with the PIC section of the policy, there should be a section of the 
policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of the flight crew. For example, the 
visual observer and sensor/payload operator positions should be outlined in the 
policy, including an identification of initial and in-service training requirements, as 
well as pre-flight, flight, and post-flight duties and responsibilities. 
In addition, the policy should contain a flight conditions and operating 
guidelines section. These sections should address hours of operation (e.g., 
daytime only, daytime and night operations) and if there are any special 
requirements for night operations or limited visibility situations (e.g., fog). Line-of-
sight requirements, altitude, and weather (e.g., hot, cold, wind speed limitations) 
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should also be addressed in the policy to ensure a standard is set for when the 
UAS can and cannot be deployed. If there are overriding situations (e.g., life 
safety) that necessitate a deviation from policy, the parameters, including 
approval authority for the deviation, should be clearly indicated in the policy. 
A section of the policy should also outline the flight requirements, including 
how mission requests will be submitted, approved, assigned, completed, and 
validated. Minimum staffing for the flight crew should be identified and must be in 
accordance with (IAW) the COA, or its equivalent authorization, issued by the 
FAA. Additionally, pre-flight, flight, and post-flight requirements should be 
outlined, including a safety check to ensure the takeoff, area of operation, and 
landing zones are clear and operationally safe.  
Additionally, a process for notifying local air traffic control, if appropriate, 
should be outlined in policy. At a minimum, a notice to airmen transmission 
should be made by the UAS ground station advising of a pending or ongoing 
flight operation. It is critical for all transmissions, coordination, and flight 
information to be documented and the process for doing so should be clearly 
articulated in a UAS program policy. 
To ensure there is delineation between law enforcement, homeland 
security, and emergency management missions, the policy should reflect an 
emergency management nexus. As such, the policy should contain a prohibitions 
section outlining unauthorized activities, including, but not limited to, law 
enforcement surveillance, traffic enforcement, and crime monitoring. With 51 
percent of those polled in a Monmouth University poll doubting that law 
enforcement agencies will use UASs appropriately, it is critical for emergency 
management agencies to ensure their UAS policies have clearly defined privacy 
protections in place.172 This provision is critical in establishing the non-intrusive 
intent of an emergency management UAS program. 
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Additionally, the policy should contain a prohibitions section reinforcing 
that the operation of the UAS will be IAW the limitations of the aircraft, identifying 
the operational air space and perimeter area requirements, outlining emergency 
call off/mission abort procedures, and a prohibition against operating UASs in the 
immediate area of manned aircraft. These prohibitions should be clearly 
identified in the policy and part of the training provided to all UAS crewmembers 
and agency leadership/management staff. 
Documentation for all aspects of the UAS mission must be maintained. 
The information captured for documentation must be comprehensive, accurate, 
and archived IAW the retention policy of the agency or jurisdiction. The 
documentation will need to be submitted to the FAA on a regular basis (e.g., 
monthly or quarterly) IAW the provisions of the COA or its equivalent 
authorization. The documentation section should also outline notification 
requirements for contacting the FAA, as well as the appropriate local and state 
agencies, in the event of a UAS emergency or UAS crash, including near-miss 
incidents.  
A critical consideration of any UAS policy concerns record retention and 
access to information. The timeframe for retention will vary jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction and is a local management decision. Due to the potential for litigation 
arising from actions taken or not taken during and in the aftermath of a disaster, 
the legal staff of the agency or jurisdiction maintaining ownership of the UAS 
program should be involved in crafting the parameters of the retention section of 
the policy. The decision may be to use the agency or jurisdiction’s standard 
retention policy or a specific retention policy may need to be developed as it 
pertains to any video, audio, or other data (i.e., environmental sampling 
telemetry) collected by UAS operations. When determining the retention period, 
agencies should review any existing retention policies for similar missions that 
have been performed by conventional rotary and/or fixed-winged aircraft for 
applicability.  
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Agencies should differentiate between tangible, mission-related flight data 
and data collected during training, exercises, and other non-mission flights. For 
example, the state of Alaska prohibits law enforcement agencies from retaining 
images obtained during a UAS mission unless “required as part of an 
investigation or prosecution; for training purposes; or by federal or state law or by 
municipal ordinance.”173 Additionally, the state of Illinois has enacted record 
retention legislation requiring law enforcement agencies to destroy all data 
collected via UAS within 30 days of acquisition unless “there is reasonable 
suspicion that the information contains evidence of criminal activity, or…the 
information is relevant to an ongoing investigation or pending criminal trial.”174 
While the aforementioned legislation does not directly apply to emergency 
management specific UAS missions, there is some applicability. Generally 
speaking, data not collected during an actual disaster response mission, or if the 
mission results in a lack of usable data, should be securely discarded within a 
reasonable timeframe (i.e., 72–96 hours).   
Access to the data collected during UAS operations must be addressed to 
ensure adequate provisions are in place to protect the information from 
unauthorized disclosure. Even though many Americans engage in risky behavior 
via their smartphones by accessing non-secured data networks or downloading 
apps from non-official app stores,175 there are significant concerns regarding the 
use and disclosure of information obtained via a UAS, regardless of the intent of 
the mission. Irrespective of expressed concern, it is incumbent upon government 
agencies to implement a policy that limits disclosure of information accessed 
during UAS missions to those agencies and organizations possessing a need to 
know.  
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Absent local ordinances and/or state statutes, President Obama’s 
February 15, 2015 memorandum on UASs specifically provides guidance for 
disclosure by stipulating,  
UAS-collected information that is not maintained in a system of 
records covered by the Privacy Act shall not be disseminated 
outside of the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or 
fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with agency 
requirements.176  
Emergency management missions, as previously noted, vary significantly in their 
intent versus law enforcement and/or homeland security centric missions. As 
such, their acceptance by the general public for domestic use in the NAS of the 
United States hinges heavily on the recognition of their non-intrusive, 
humanitarian use as a life-saving resource.   
Related to the disclosure of UAS data is the provision for public records 
requests that may be initiated by the media or general public. With the evolving 
nature of UASs and the prevalence of their use considered as a newsworthy 
event by the media, any UAS policy should include provisions for how public 
records requests will be handled. While the procedures may be consistent with 
existing processes for handling requests submitted under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), agencies and jurisdictions need to consider if data 
gathered under disaster response missions warrant special protection. While 
some may argue that data should be released via a FOIA request regardless of 
the agency obtaining the data, disaster response missions should be afforded an 
exemption for any photos, audio recordings, or videos obtained during or in the 
aftermath of a catastrophic event involving mass casualties or mass fatalities due 
to the potential graphic nature of the information obtained. 
Based on the level of the transparency that is expected of government 
agencies, an annual report should be developed and made accessible for public 
review. The requirement to publish an annual report should be contained within 
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the agency or jurisdiction’s UAS policy. At a minimum, the report should address 
the number of training and mission flights conducted, the number of flights that 
resulted in information being obtained and stored, the disposition of that 
information, training completed by the flight crew(s), and the approximate cost to 
operate the program.  
Lastly, the UAS policy should address risk management processes 
concerning the insurance liability of the jurisdiction operating the UAS. While 
many jurisdictions are self-insured, they should determine if additional liability 
insurance from a private insurance company is necessary as part of their risk 
management program. Regardless of whether specific insurance for the UAS 
program is obtained from a private insurance company or if the liability for 
operation is covered under the jurisdiction’s self-insured risk management 
program, the UAS policy should reflect the type of liability coverage in effect.  
B. PROGRAM CONSIDERATIONS  
As noted previously, due to the nature of disaster response UAS missions, 
there are inherent differences between emergency management missions, 
military, law enforcement, and/or homeland security missions. As such, it is 
important to identify design considerations that should be considered when 
selecting a UAS platform for disaster response missions. While technology is 
continually evolving, the general design considerations should remain consistent. 
1. UAS Design Considerations 
One of the first program considerations should be the type and size of 
UAS identified for use in the program. The release of FAA rules and regulations 
for UASs may very well impact the decision on the type of UAS used if, for 
example, the restrictions are more favorable toward small UASs (i.e., 5 pounds 
or less) than larger UASs (i.e., 55 pounds or more). Factors to consider when 
agencies are determining the type of UAS to procure include a navigation system 
that will return the unit to its home base when battery power gets low or the 
system loses signal with the PIC. Additionally, as noted in the Policy 
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Considerations section of this thesis, cyber provisions should be in place to 
prevent mission information from being compromised as well as to protect the 
platform from being commandeered by a third party. 
Moreover, it is critical for agencies to determine the information needs that 
exist as those needs will assist in determining the payload requirements of the 
UAS. For the purposes of this thesis, “payload” refers to, but is not limited to, 
sensory packages (e.g., forward looking infrared [FLIR], weather, environmental 
sampling), audio packages, and cameras (e.g., still-frame, video, hyperspectral 
imaging) that can be attached to a UAS. Whether the payload requirements 
result in the procurement and operation of multiple UASs or a single platform with 
multiple capabilities is a determination that will need to be made by each agency 
or jurisdiction based on available funding and the allowable provisions of its COA 
or FAA authorization. A sample sensory integration diagram for a COTS UAS is 
depicted in Figure 5. Additionally, an example of a relatively low-cost, lean-
sensing environmental detection payload using a COTS UAS platform carrying a 
HazMat test strip is noted in Figure 6.  
71 
Figure 5.  A Sample Sensory Integration Diagram of a COTS UAS 
 
Source: H. Wang, Coorg R. Prasad, and Robert M. Serino, “Lean Sensing: 
Intelligent, Low-Cost, Remote Detection by Integrating Currently Available 
Components for Distant Early Warning,” The Journal of the Homeland Defense 
and Security Information Analysis Center 2, no. 1 (2015): 16. 
Figure 6.  UAS with a Low-Cost Environmental Detection Payload 
 
Source: Wang, Prasad, and Serino, “Lean Sensing,” 16. 
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The benefit of using a COTS UAS system such as the one noted in Figure 
6 is that it is a relatively low-cost system that is deployable in practically any 
HazMat situation. In this particular scenario, the unit could be landed on the 
chemical hazard in question and transmit video of the sampling paper, thereby 
indicating the hazard present without placing emergency responders in a 
hazardous environment. The platform could then, if necessary, be disposed of as 
hazardous waste without a significant cost to the agency or jurisdiction.   
Another area some agencies and jurisdictions have considered for their 
UAS program is whether the platform will be tethered or untethered. Regardless 
of whether the UAS is tethered or untethered, there is still a requirement to obtain 
a §333 approval from the FAA, including the issuance of a COA. Table 2 notes 
some pros and cons to consider when weighing the decision as to whether to 
pursue a tethered or untethered UAS.  
Table 2.   Pros and Cons of Tethered versus Untethered UASs 
Pros Cons 
Increased flight time Restricted mobility and range 
Increased data transmission rates Restricted operational environment 
Increased flight control and safety Tether can become tangled 
Limits opportunities to hack system More ground-infrastructure required 
Increased privacy protection Electrocution hazard 
Source: Jack Nicas and Tarun Shukla, “Some Drones Are Put on a Leash,” Wall 
Street Journal, August 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/some-drones-are-put-on-
a-leash-1438557521.  
In addition to tethering options, some agencies have taken a different 
approach and have obtained blimps to perform aerial reconnaissance. Blimps 
possess similar capabilities and pros/cons in comparison to those of a tethered 
UAS. While standard UASs, whether tethered or not, require an FAA COA to 
operate, a blimp, such as one operated by the Ohio Department of 
Transportation (ODOT), is classified as a moored balloon and does not require 
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FAA approval to operate.177 As such, blimps are deployable without the 
requirement of obtaining a COA from the FAA. However, “surveillance blimps” 
are not without limitations and, as such, present potential concerns necessitating 
consideration before procuring such a system. For example, the deployment of a 
surveillance blimp to assist with a manhunt in Pennsylvania in October 2014 was 
taken out of service after being considered ineffective due to the terrain and tree 
canopy in the search area.178 In addition to operational limitations, blimps such 
as ODOT’s are costly to purchase at approximately $180,000 each, not including 
the cost to fill the blimp with helium prior to deployment, which is in excess of 
$1,000. Prolonged deployments require additional helium to maintain 
operations.179 As costs are a significant factor for agencies and jurisdictions to 
consider when making the determination of whether to implement a UAS 
program, blimps may prove to be cost prohibitive, especially when funding 
sources to establish a UAS program may be limited. While costs associated with 
most technologies decrease over time, there is no significant evidence indicating 
an anticipated decrease in surveillance blimp costs in the near future.  
Additionally, while blimps have been hailed as a safer alternative to 
untethered UASs, they are not infallible as evidenced by the October 2015 
untethering of a U.S. Army surveillance blimp from its moorings at the Aberdeen 
Proving Grounds in Maryland.180 With the potential liability of an untethered, non-
controllable blimp, agencies and jurisdictions need to factor liabilities into their 
decision concerning which platform(s) should be included in their UAS program. 
                                            
177 Dominic Binkley, “Ohio Buys ‘Blimp in a Box’ for Surveillance,” The Columbus Dispatch, 
July 21, 2014, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/science/2014/07/20/blimp-in-a-box.html.  
178 Cyrus Farivar, “Pennsylvania State Cops Borrow, Then Return, Spy Blimp to Aid 
Manhunt,” Ars Technica, October 29, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/10/
pennsylvania-state-cops-borrow-then-return-spy-blimp-to-aid-manhunt/.  
179 Binkley, “Ohio Buys “Blimp in a Box’ for Surveillance.”  
180 “Military Blimp Comes Loose in Maryland, Monitored by Fighter Jets over Pennsylvania,” 
CBS News, October 28, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/military-blimp-maryland-fighter-
jets-pennsylvania/.  
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2. Organizational Structure and Support 
The implementation of a UAS program represents a significant investment 
in personnel, equipment, training, and funding for the agency or jurisdiction 
looking to establish the program. As previously noted, regardless of the 
organization, there must be support for a UAS program at the highest levels of 
the organization for it to succeed. Although UAS support may be available from 
the federal government by tasking agencies such as CBP or DSCA mission 
assignment to DOD assets, UAS programs implemented at the local level of 
government offer the quickest response option. As such, this thesis promotes the 
establishment of disaster response UAS programs within local or county EMAs 
and/or within state-level EMA regional offices. 
If available, a UAS advocate is an asset who can assist with establishing a 
UAS program. For example, states such as Ohio, in partnership with the state of 
Indiana, have established a UAS center focused on “advanc[ing] the 
commercialization of technology through research, design, testing, and 
evaluation and the subsequent certification of systems or system components 
and supporting the UAS community in research and development, facilitating 
safe integration into the [NAS].”181 While not an operational component, the 
Ohio/Indiana UAS Center is a valuable resource that supports the expansion of 
UASs in the NAS of the United States for public and private operations. A 
significant benefit of the Ohio/Indiana UAS Center is the pre-establishment of 
multiple COAs that provide venues for UAS flight testing and evaluation (see 
Figure 7). Another example of a UAS test center is at the New Mexico State 
University, which has an approved COA for a test area encompassing over 
15,000 square miles (see Figure 8).182 Agencies and jurisdictions establishing a 
                                            
181 Ohio Department of Transportation, “About the Ohio/Indiana Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Center,” accessed November 30, 2015, http://www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/uas/Pages/
About.aspx.  
182 New Mexico State University, “21st Century Aerospace: The UAS FTC: Your Gateway to 
the National Airspace System,” accessed December 21, 2015, https://psl.nmsu.edu/
The%20UAS%20Flight%20Test%20Center.  
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UAS program should look toward similar centers, if they exist, in their respective 
states, which may be able to assist with the establishment of their program.  
Figure 7.  Ohio/Indiana UAS Center Approved COAs 
 
Source: Ohio Department of Transportation, “About the Ohio/Indiana  
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center,” accessed November 30, 2015, 
http://www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/uas/Pages/About.aspx. 
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Figure 8.  New Mexico State University Approved COA 
 
Source: New Mexico State University, “21st Century Aerospace.” 
Due to requirements of a UAS program, it may be beneficial to develop 
the program as a regional asset that could deploy anywhere within a given region 
or state. The development of a regional program would be beneficial in those 
areas that do not have sufficient funding and resources to develop a jurisdiction 
specific disaster response UAS program. While the deployment of a regional 
asset could take more time to deploy than a single jurisdictional asset, it would 
likely be available for mission assignment significantly quicker than many state-
level UAS assets.  
The development of a regional UAS program would require a 
memorandum of understanding between the counties or agencies that comprise 
the program. There is a basis for developing regional teams and programs as 
many states, including Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Texas, maintain regional HazMat teams, swift water rescue teams, emergency 
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ordnance disposal teams, special response teams, communication assets, and 
medical response teams. While different than a UAS program, the basic 
foundation and procedures for establishing these teams is transferrable 
regardless of the capability fielded.  
Regardless of the decision to develop a single jurisdiction or regional UAS 
program, one significant topic for consideration would be the types of missions 
performed by the UAS. As evidenced earlier in this thesis, there are significant 
concerns regarding the use of UASs for law enforcement and/or homeland 
security related missions. As such, separate operational parameters and record 
retention standards would need established, including the handling of potential 
criminal indicators, crimes, or crime scenes (e.g., marijuana growing operations) 
that may be inadvertently observed during a disaster response mission.  
3. Funding 
Before a UAS program can be developed and implemented, a dedicated 
funding stream for operational and sustainment costs must be identified. As 
mentioned in the Barriers Complicating the Use of UASs section of this thesis, 
funding for UASs is theoretically available through the EMPG, SHSP, and UASI 
grants as UASs are an eligible expenditure and listed as such on DHS’ AEL. 
However, funding for UASs under these programs is currently curtailed183 and as 
such does not represent a viable funding option at this time. Therefore, agencies 
and jurisdictions may need to identify other funding streams (e.g., general 
revenue funds) or methods (e.g., donations) to obtain a UAS. In addition to the 
procurement and maintenance costs for a UAS, agencies and jurisdictions would 
need to factor in staff costs associated with meeting certification, training, and 
operational requirements. 
                                            
183 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Approved Equipment List,” accessed 
December 21, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/authorized-equipment-list-item/03oe-07-suas.  
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With literally hundreds of UAV platforms to choose from when establishing 
a UAS program,184 a comprehensive review should occur prior to procuring a 
UAS. As an example, the cost of the latest generation DJI Phantom Professional 
Quadcopter with a 4K camera is approximately $1,200.00.185 This represents a 
minimal investment for many jurisdictions and could serve as a base-model UAS, 
primarily focused on video reconnaissance and low-level environmental detection 
via HazMat detection strips. However, mounting options exist for attaching 
additional sensors to the quadcopter, if available and within the lift parameters of 
the platform. Research on the price of UASs used by governmental agencies 
reveals costs ranging from $0.00 in Medina County, OH, where two UASs were 
donated to the Medina County Sheriff’s Office, to $160,000 for an Aeryon 
SkyRanger purchased by MSP, to $31 million for the Predator-B operated by 
CBP.186 Such a wide range of pricing indicates the multitude of UAS options 
currently available, with the number of options and manufacturers expected to 
increase exponentially once the FAA finalizes the UAS rules and regulations. 
4. Training and Maintenance  
Each agency or jurisdiction operating a UAS program must ensure pre-
service and in-service training requirements are met and maintained. While to 
date there has been a lack of clear-cut guidance from the FAA, the Frequently 
Asked Questions section of the UAS portion of the FAA’s website notes: 
Pilot certification requirements for petitions for exemption under 
Section 333 are evaluated on a case-by-case basis. While Section 
333 grants the Secretary of Transportation flexibility with regard to 
airworthiness certification requirements, it does not grant the 
Secretary any flexibility with regard to airman certification standards 
                                            
184 Amazon, “DJI Phantom 3 Professional Quadcopter 4K UHD Video Camera Drone,” 
accessed November 29, 2015, http://www.amazon.com/DJI-Phantom-Professional-Quadcopter-
Camera/dp/B00VSITBJO.  
185 Ibid.  
186 Grazier and Genson, “Medina County Sheriff’s Office Drones Cleared for Flight;” Michel, 
“Customs and Border Protection Drones;” Gus Burns, “Michigan State Police Receive Federal 
Authorization to Fly Drones on Law Enforcement Missions,” MLive, March 9, 2015, 
http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2015/03/michigan_state_police_receive.html.  
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as outlined in Sections 44703 and 44711 of Title 49 of the United 
States Code (49 USC). An FAA airman certificate is required to 
operate an aircraft in the National Airspace System.187 
As previously mentioned, the interpretation espoused by the FAA, that a 
UAS operated by a civilian hobbyist is not an aircraft but one operated by a 
government agency is, represents a clear contradiction in logic that must be 
addressed if UASs are going to be used to their full potential. Absent the FAA 
waiving the airman certificate, government agency UAS operators or PICs and 
visual observers must possess an airline transport, commercial, private, 
recreational, or sport pilot certificate if operating a UAS in the NAS. Due to 
evolving FAA UAS rules and regulations, agencies and jurisdictions establishing 
a UAS program should contact the FAA’s UAS Integration Office for the latest 
training and certification requirements. 
In addition to formal FAA PIC and visual observer certification 
requirements, agencies should implement internal training requirements, 
including identifying a requisite number of flights that must be completed by a 
PIC and visual observer prior to becoming operationally deployable, as well as to 
maintain their current certification. Additionally, training should be provided for 
sensor/payload operators as well. Absent an FAA or national standard, agencies 
should develop the standard for training and document the training accordingly. 
As with the PIC and visual observer certification requirements, agencies should 
maintain routine contact with the FAA’s UAS Integration Office to ensure 
compliance with existing training and certification requirements. 
As with any operational program involving equipment, maintenance is an 
area that must be included in any UAS program. As observed by Hobbs and 
Herwitz, UASs have a higher accident rate than traditional rotary and fixed-
                                            
187 Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).  
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winged aircraft; however, the majority of accidents are due to human error.188 
Hobbs and Herwitz further advance that unlike manned aircraft, “UAV operators 
must ensure the reliability of an entire system that comprises the vehicle, the 
ground station, and communication equipment.”189 As such, maintenance is a 
critical safety component necessitating guidance in the UAS program policy and 
SOPs. Unless the agency fielding the UASs has maintenance staff with UAS 
maintenance experience or maintenance contracts in place, it is recommended 
that any maintenance exceeding preventative and basic upkeep (e.g., cleaning, 
tightening screws, attaching payload packages) be performed by the UAS 
manufacturer, especially concerning the maintenance of any electrical 
components. Additionally, the program policy and SOPs should require the 
completion and retention of maintenance logs for all repairs and maintenance 
performed on the UAS(s). Lastly, agencies should maintain routine contact with 
the FAA’s UAS Integration Office to ensure compliance with any maintenance 





                                            
188 Alan Hobbs, and Stanley R. Herwitz, Human Factors in the Maintenance of Unmanned 
Aircraft,” Technical Report, Office of the Chief Scientist for Human Factors, Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles Human Factors: Program Review FY05, Federal Aviation Administration, 2005, 
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/library/documents/media/
human_factors_maintenance/maint_binder.pdf, 1. 
189 Ibid.  
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VII. THE WAY FORWARD 
That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind. 
— Neil Armstrong, astronaut 
 
A. SUMMARY 
Emergencies and disasters provide an environment that is conducive to 
the use of UASs to support the efforts of emergency responders deploying for 
such events. As repeatedly indicated in this thesis, significant mission, life-
saving, and resource benefits exist for the use of UASs in emergency 
management. The costs of UASs, especially small UASs, are significantly less 
than the cost of conventional rotary and fixed-winged aircraft, not to mention they 
are safer. If for no other reason than cost alone, the use of UASs should be 
considered by governmental agencies when evaluating areas in which they can 
streamline operational costs and increase efficiency. For example, as previously 
noted, the deployment of UASs is often more rapid than other platforms, and 
critical flight data can be provided more expeditiously to ICPs and EOCs as well. 
An additional benefit of using UASs during disasters is the fact they are 
expendable, whereas emergency responders are not.  
As it pertains to UASs, emergency management is at a crossroads. The 
evolving technology offered by UASs can either be embraced and used to 
enhance disaster response or the use of existing platforms can continue. As 
established in this thesis, there are multiple barriers that limit the use of UASs in 
the NAS; however, none of these barriers are insurmountable. With an 
opportunity to be on the leading edge of the UAS revolution, it is an exciting time 
to be in emergency management. The author argues that EMAs should move 
forward with the establishment of UAS programs for disaster response by 
embracing UAS technology and the many benefits it offers for mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery operations.   
82 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The use of UASs for disaster response missions offers a significant 
enhancement to the capabilities of emergency responders as they provide for the 
safety of the general public. As such, the integration of UASs into the emergency 
management and first responder disciplines must be a priority for the FAA, as 
well as local and state governments. This thesis offers seven recommendations, 
focusing at the local, state, and federal levels, with the most comprehensive 
recommendation calling for the establishment of a new office within the FAA that 
is responsible for coordinating governmental UAS programs with local and state 
government agencies. These recommendations are outlined below.  
1. Conduct of a Feasibility Study Prior to Implementation 
While this thesis argues the benefits of a UAS program for disaster 
response, any agency or jurisdiction considering the establishment of a UAS 
program for disaster response missions, or any mission for that matter, should 
convene a feasibility study to evaluate the need for such a program. A UAS 
program should not be established simply for the sake of doing so or because it 
is perceived as the latest innovation in disaster response. Factors to consider, 
listed in no particular order, include: agency and administration support; 
legalities; organizational costs, assignment, and administration; cost analysis of 
UAS missions in comparison to conventional rotary and fixed-winged aircraft; 
flight crew staffing and certification requirements; FAA approval processes; 
funding stream and procurement processes; training; maintenance; long-term 
sustainability; public perception and education; and the size/type of UAS needed 
(e.g., small UAS).  
If the feasibility study determines the implementation of a UAS program is 
not practical, then there is no need to proceed with any further action; however, if 
the study determines there is an existent need to implement a UAS program, the 
agency or jurisdiction should proceed with developing a policy to serve as the 
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basis of the program. That policy should be included with any approval or 
authorization requests (e.g., COA) that is submitted to the FAA. 
2. Program Funding 
Whether new or a reallocation from existing programs, a dedicated 
funding source to implement a UAS program is necessary for procurement and 
sustainment of the program. While some agencies and jurisdictions are fortunate 
enough to have funding in their existing budgets to allocate for a UAS program, 
the reality is many do not. The EMPG and HSGP are two examples of funding 
that can be potentially be used to implement a UAS program.  
As noted previously, even though UASs are an authorized item on the 
AEL, FEMA is not currently funding their procurement pending the 
implementation of recommendations from the White House Law Enforcement 
Working Group. The lack of funding approval by FEMA for UASs is to some 
degree understandable due to a lack of progress by the FAA on issuing rules and 
regulations for public sector use; however, the fact remains that UASs are an 
allowable item under both the EMPG and HSGP. While FEMA has temporarily 
suspended the approval of UAS funding requests pending the aforementioned 
implementation of recommendations, FEMA needs to recognize the use of UASs 
is not solely for law enforcement missions. While some may argue that FEMA is 
aware of this, its focus, at least to this point, has been on the law enforcement 
application of UASs, not the humanitarian application offered by emergency 
management UAS programs.  
Additionally, once the stay on funding for UASs is removed, purchasing 
options under the HSGP are somewhat restricted, as the grant currently requires 
a terrorism nexus for funds expended under the grant.190 It is time the HSGP 
evolves to fully incorporate an all-hazards approach that recognizes the need to 
provide funding for disaster response missions sans the requirement of a linkage 
to terrorism preparedness. By recognizing an all-hazards approach to 
                                            
190 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 107th Cong. (2002).   
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preparedness, the HSGP could provide a valuable funding stream for local 
governments to leverage as they establish and sustain a UAS program; however, 
the expansion of funding to support an all-hazard approach for equipment such 
as UASs is not a FEMA decision and must be addressed by Congress when 
allocating funding for the HSGP.  
Notwithstanding the current provision of the HSGP that limits funding to 
equipment with a clear nexus to terrorism, the EMPG contains provisions 
authorizing the procurement of equipment for local and state EMAs. The EMPG, 
which “provides federal funds to states to assist state, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments in preparing for all hazards,” contains a provision for the purchase 
of equipment for disaster response.191 As such, UASs are generally allowable as 
an equipment purchase under the grant; however, as with the HSGP, FEMA has 
temporarily halted the approval of equipment projects involving UASs. It is 
expected that FEMA will remove this stay on funding for UASs; however, this 
stay needs to be lifted sooner versus later to allow local EMAs to move forward 
with establishing a UAS program for those jurisdictions desiring to implement 
such a program. 
3. Public Engagement and Education 
Irrespective of its intent, vis-à-vis disaster management, law enforcement, 
or homeland security missions, privacy concerns represent a significant barrier 
against the implementation of a UAS program. In order to mitigate this barrier, 
the author recommends the establishment of a public engagement and education 
program to reinforce the benefits of using UASs for disaster response prior to the 
implementation of any such program. Failing to do otherwise risks a public outcry 
similar to the aforementioned events in Seattle, WA, which resulted in the 
termination of a UAS program due to a failure to win public support. The use of 
                                            
191 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2015 Emergency Management 
Performance Grant Program Notice of Funding Opportunity (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2015).     
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UASs can and will result in saving lives, which is a critical point that needs to be 
conveyed to the general public to obtain support.  
4. Identify a Local Lead Agency for the UAS Program 
For UASs to gain acceptance for their potential humanitarian benefits, the 
local/county EMA should be the lead agency for a disaster response centric UAS 
program at the local level. Designating the local/county EMA as the lead agency 
for an emergency management specific UAS program can assist in mitigating or 
reducing privacy and government intrusion concerns associated with law 
enforcement and/or homeland security agency UAS deployments.  
While it is recognized that having a UAS dedicated solely to disaster 
response missions may be redundant if the capability exists within, for instance, 
a local law enforcement agency, EMA-based UASs would provide capabilities 
focused on disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. An 
additional benefit of having a UAS platform dedicated to disaster response would 
be the elimination of conflicting mission priorities with other agencies. Due to the 
dynamic nature of emergency management and law enforcement missions and 
the inherent life safety parameters that exist, a shared platform is not 
recommended. While some may posit this constitutes a duplication of effort and 
cost, it is a necessary redundancy to ensure the performance of missions when 
needed without mission prioritization conflicts.  
The secondary benefit of having an emergency management specific UAS 
is due to the differences in mission types and the potential retention policy 
variances between a UAS focused on disaster response and one focused on law 
enforcement and/or homeland security missions (e.g., surveillance operations, 
special operations support). While this thesis advances a recommendation for an 
emergency management specific UAS, there should be no preclusion of using an 
emergency management UAS for a law enforcement and/or homeland security 
focused mission or vice versa should an emergency situation so warrant.  
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5. Consider Establishing a State-Level UAS Center 
As mentioned previously, the states of Indiana and Ohio have collaborated 
to form a joint UAS center, located in Springfield, OH, to offer “a mix of resources 
and a variety of test ranges to support research, development, testing and 
evaluation of [UAS] technologies.”192 A UAS center situated at the state level as 
a proponent and supporter of UAS operations would serve as a valuable 
resource positioned to assist private and public sector partners with the 
establishment of a program.  
In that UASs are considered aircraft by the FAA, albeit unmanned aircraft, 
a UAS center may very well serve as a component under ESF-1 Transportation 
or the department of transportation at the state-level. While organizing a UAS 
center as an asset under ESF-1 or the department of transportation at the state-
level is not a requirement, it would be consistent with the organization of the 
Ohio/Indiana UAS Center, which serves as a partnership model for a state-level 
UAS center. In addition to the Ohio/Indiana UAS Center, there are other UAS 
centers at New Mexico State University,193 Texas A&M University-Corpus 
Christi,194 and within the North Dakota Department of Commerce.195 Regardless 
of whether a UAS center is organized at the state level or resides within 
academia, its establishment is recommended so that a formal advocacy and 
research center is available to assist agencies seeking to establish a UAS 
program.  
                                            
192 Ohio Department of Transportation, “About the Ohio/Indiana Unmanned.”  
193 New Mexico State University, “21st Century Aerospace.”  
194 Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Announces Texas UAS Test Site Now 
Operational,” news release, June 20, 2014, Federal Aviation Administration, https://www.faa.gov/
news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsid=16454.  
195 Federal Aviation Administration, “ FAA Announces First UAS Test Site Operational,” 
news release, Federal Aviation Administration, April 21, 2014, https://www.faa.gov/news/
press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=16154  
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6. Implement an Emergency Waiver Process for Immediate Life 
Safety Disaster Response Missions 
Due to the life safety issues involved with responding to disasters, it is 
necessary to streamline the approval of emergency UAS flight operations (e.g., 
searching for flash flood survivors). The current 24-hour timeframe for the 
issuance of an emergency COA is unacceptable and needlessly jeopardizes 
human lives. The question of whether an FAA liaison working with a state-level 
UAS center or the FAA UAS Integration Office has the authority to issue the 
authorization/approval is largely inconsequential, as long as the approval process 
is immediate. However, a process must be in place to grant an immediate 
authorization to the requesting agency during emergency situations. One option 
for granting an immediate authorization is a provision for a waiver to obtain an 
emergency COA, or equivalent, in those situations where there is an immediate 
life safety situation (e.g., search and rescue operations). In these types of 
situations, minutes, or even seconds may be the difference between life and 
death for victims of a disaster.  
Bogging down UAS approvals in a bureaucratic administrative process is 
simply unacceptable. The reality is that, should the FAA fail to implement an 
emergency waiver provision for the operation of a UAS in a life/death situation, 
emergency responders will do what they have to do and deploy UASs without 
any approval. While the FAA would assuredly consider this a violation of its rules 
as they currently exist, the FAA would never win this battle in the court of public 
opinion. Therefore, it is recommended for the FAA do what is prudent, which is to 
implement an emergency waiver process that can be initiated upon the order of 
an incident commander or local/county/state EMA director or, as previously 
mentioned, assign an FAA liaison that can issue an immediate authorization. 
7. Establish an FAA Liaison Office for Local and State 
Government 
The final recommendation, and arguably one of the most challenging to 
implement, will be the establishment of a liaison office within the FAA to work 
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directly with local and state government agencies seeking to establish a UAS 
program. While some may view this creation as an additional level of 
bureaucracy, an FAA liaison office, hereafter referred to as the liaison office, 
would serve a critical role in streamlining the UAS approval process for local and 
state government agencies. With a sole focus on local and state government 
programs, the liaison office would be able to expeditiously approve authorization 
requests as it would not be distracted with the management and approval of UAS 
operations for private sector organizations. This is an important point as heavy 
lobbying efforts by special interest groups appear to be garnering the majority of 
the FAA’s attention, resulting in a hindrance to the implementation of government 
rules and regulations. 
The establishment of a liaison office would not be without challenges and 
will need support from a diverse group of supporters. Therefore, a strategy must 
be developed and implemented if the recommendation to establish a liaison 
office is to be advanced. The selectorate theory, which includes the nominal 
selectorate, real selectorate, and the winning coalition,196 will identify the key 
stakeholders involved in this initiative. This identification of stakeholders is 
necessary so the principals involved in establishing the liaison office recognize 
the patrons necessary to establish the program.  
The nominal selectorate, or interchangeables,197 represented in this 
strategy include the citizens that will benefit from the use of UASs in disaster 
response. This thesis has noted numerous instances where lives were saved as 
the result of a UAS deployment during disasters. There have also been multiple 
references to other UAS missions that have provided for public safety, including 
the aforementioned monitoring of radiation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan.198 
                                            
196 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad 
Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), Kindle ed., 4.  
197 Ibid.   
198 Everstine, “Drones Play Role in Disaster Response.”  
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The nominal selectorate is a key stakeholder in the implementation of a UAS 
program for disaster response. Therefore, providing for public safety and security 
should be a top priority for the liaison office. 
The real selectorate, or influentials,199 represent those that “make it 
happen.” When introducing a concept such as the establishment of a liaison 
office within the FAA, its establishment must have support or the program will 
never gain the necessary momentum for implementation. While this support 
should begin as a grassroots effort at the local level, it takes the buy-in of those 
with influence over a particular area of government for this to come to fruition. In 
the case of establishing a liaison office, it will take the support of representatives 
in Congress, the secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the 
administrator of the FAA to implement an initiative such as a liaison office.  
The first challenge of establishing a liaison office will be convincing the 
influentials of the issues at hand and offering a feasible way to implement a 
program fostering the development of governmental UAS programs. Due to the 
variances in mission type and intent, it is important to separate the government 
use of UASs from the private sector use. Government-based UAS programs are 
focused on public safety and providing assistance during emergency situations 
and disasters, whereas private sector interests are primarily profit-driven with an 
emphasis on providing expedited customer service or enhanced services, all of 
which are implemented with the intent of obtaining a larger market share of a 
given service (e.g., delivery, geo-mapping, videography).   
The winning coalition, or the essentials,200 includes organizations such as 
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and its diverse membership. 
The AOPA is recognized as the largest, most influential general aviation 
association in the world.201 As such, it represents the leading potential advocacy 
                                            
199 de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, 4. 
200 Ibid., 5. 
201 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, “About AOPA,” Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, accessed December 7, 2015, http://www.aopa.org/About-AOPA.  
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group for the implementation of practical UAS rules and regulations. While its 
constituency is primarily private pilots and aircraft owners, the establishment of 
sensible UAS regulations would benefit both the public and private sector 
implementation of UAS programs. 
Once created, the liaison office would serve as part of the winning 
coalition as their support translates to a victory for those local and state agencies 
seeking to establish a UAS program, yet are unsure of how to proceed with 
program implementation. The liaison office would assist the winning coalition by 
offering sample UAS policy guidelines, providing guidance and assistance 
concerning the completion of the documentation necessary to request an 
approval for a local and/or state UAS program, establishing and providing 
guidance on training and certification requirements, and offering technical 
assistance to assist in the implementation of the program. Additionally, local and 
state governments, as well as private sector organizations, are also part of the 
winning coalition. They offer their support to organizations such as the AOPA and 
UAS centers, which serve as advocates for the advancement of sensible rules 
and regulations governing the safe operation of UASs in the NAS. 
Due to the numerous delays that have occurred with the issuance of UAS 
rules and regulations by the FAA, the expectations of the liaison office would be 
significant and, as such, the office must be empowered with the authority to 
implement the program. This includes the authority to streamline the approval 
and authorization process for local and state UAS programs so the programmatic 
requirements are not so stringent they stymie the development and 
implementation of governmental UAS programs. The liaison office would also 
need to implement the “validated learning principle” to ensure they are meeting 
the customers’ needs.202 This validation can occur via regular feedback sessions 
and surveys with the office’s constituency. These sessions should be personal in 
nature with face-to-face meetings versus simply sending an online survey. For a 
                                            
202 Eric Ries, The Lean Startup (New York: Crown Business, 2011), Kindle ed., 8.  
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startup organization such as a liaison office to be successful, it must develop a 
business relationship with its customers and then nurture those relationships by 
balancing the needs of its constituency against practical rules and regulations.  
The change proposed by this recommendation would benefit local and 
state agencies seeking to establish a UAS program by streamlining the 
application process for these agencies and offering technical support to assist in 
program implementation. It is critical for government agencies to have the option 
of developing UAS programs to enhance their statutory responsibilities to provide 
for the public safety of the general public. By opening the NAS to UASs in a 
practical and controlled manner, agencies such as EMAs, can respond more 
rapidly and efficiently to disasters for missions such as locating survivors of 
disasters (e.g., flash floods, tornadoes, landslides), environmental sampling, 
critical infrastructure inspections, determining building/structural integrity, 
conducting damage assessments, and compiling SA when determining a COP. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH  
The topic of autonomous UASs presents a variety of issues that could 
warrant its own thesis focusing on the legalities, ethics, and perceptions 
associated with its implementation. As noted by the DOD’s Unmanned Systems 
Integration Roadmap FY2011–2036, “[a]dvances in autonomy will further 
increase operational capability, manpower efficiencies, and cost savings.”203 
Expanding the use of UASs to include provisions for autonomous operations will 
require an additional evolution in technology as well as increased acceptance by 
the general public of a platform operated with limited, and eventually minimal, 
human involvement. There are significant risks posed by the use of automated 
systems, regardless of platform (e.g., automobiles, UASs), which warrants 
extensive research and review prior to implementation. As the integration of 
                                            
203 U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, 
Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 46. 
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artificial intelligence into unmanned operations continues to advance, future 
research should include an examination of autonomous UAS operations.  
The integration of fully autonomous UASs will not occur overnight and 
encompasses a four-level process as outlined in the Unmanned Systems 
Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036. The first level of autonomy is essentially 
what exists today with UASs controlled solely by a human.204 This level of 
human control is asserted over all elements of a UAS mission, including take-off, 
performance of mission taskings (e.g., video, photographs, environmental 
sampling), re-assignment to a different area of responsibility (AOR), and 
returning to home base (i.e., landing). 
The second level of autonomy involves the delegation of human control to 
the UAS. At this level, the UAS “performs many functions independently of 
human control when delegated to do so…This level… must be activated or 
deactivated by human input.”205 At this level of autonomy, functions such as 
travel to the AOR and activation of the payload (e.g., video, environmental 
sampling sensors) would be delegated to the UAS by the human operator.    
The third level of autonomy “involves human supervised systems.”206 This 
level of autonomy results in a UAS performing a mission once given direction and 
guidance by a human operator. Autonomy at the third level results in more UAS 
control of a mission by allowing the platform to make adjustments to the mission 
assignment based on data that is received during the deployment. However, any 
adjustment to the assigned mission would have to be within the parameters of 
the current mission assignment (i.e., the UAS could not deviate from the 
AOR).207 The independence afforded the UAS at this level is significant and is 
only superseded by a UAS operating with complete autonomy.  
                                            
204 Ibid.   
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Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2015), 418. 
206 Ibid.  
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The fourth and final level of autonomy is when the UAS becomes fully 
independent.208 At this level, based on the general direction provided by a 
human operator, the UAS performs tasks “without human interaction.”209 As 
noted by the DOD, “A human could still enter the loop in an emergency or 
change the goals, although in practice there may be significant time delays 
before human intervention occurs.”210 This fourth level of autonomy is similar to 
the technology that is in the developmental phase for the U.S. Navy’s long range 
anti-ship missile, which can make adjustments en route to a target based on its 
radar sensing and evading technology.211 The future use of autonomous 
technology will assuredly manifest itself in many platforms (e.g., cars, military 
ground forces, planes, UASs, weapons systems) and will require oversight to 
ensure this technology does not morph into a “Hollywoodesque” scenario where 
humans lack control of the systems. 
With the rapid expansion and prevalence of UASs in essentially all 
elements of society (e.g., military, hobbyists, private sector, first responder and 
emergency management agencies), it is critical to ensure practical and concrete 
regulations, policies, and procedures are in place to serve as a foundation to 
accommodate future advances in autonomous technology. While the FAA has 
experienced significant issues and complaints concerning the painstakingly slow 
development of rules and regulations regarding the use of UASs in the NAS, it 
must exercise extreme prudence when considering the use of autonomous UASs 
in the NAS.  
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APPENDIX A. DECISION GUIDE 
The decision as to whether or not to implement a UAS program requires 
an in-depth review and a comprehensive decision-making process. The intent of 
this decision guide is to foster that review and provide policy makers and 
practitioners with factors for consideration when assessing the need for an 
agency or jurisdictional UAS program. Listed in Figure 9, as well as in a larger 
format in Appendix B, is a decision tree that can be followed and a supporting 
narrative explaining each critical decision point and subsequent program area 
that should be considered, when assessing the need for a UAS program.  
Figure 9.  Decision Tree 
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A. CONDUCT FEASIBILITY STUDY 
Not all feasibility studies are alike as there are a multitude of variables 
(e.g., equipment, organizational structure, new product designs) concerning its 
structure. The value in conducting a feasibility study should not be 
underestimated. However, the first step in conducting a feasibility study should 
be defining or describing the program.  
B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION  
The UAS program description should note the type of missions the 
platform is intended to perform (e.g., search and rescue, environmental 
sampling, situational awareness, damage assessment) and if these missions are 
currently being performed via another platform, such as conventional rotary and 
fixed-wing aircraft. Additionally, an operational plan should be included in the 
description (e.g., criteria for deployment) and the proposed timeline from concept 
to implementation.  
C. NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
A critical component of any feasibility study is the formulation and conduct 
of a needs assessment. When evaluating the need to procure technology such 
as a UAS, it is important to conduct a needs assessment to ensure there is a 
bonafide need and that the procurement is not arbitrary. While the questions 
asked via a needs assessment may vary based on the subject, this thesis 
advances the following 12-step needs assessment process for determining the 
feasibility of implementing a UAS program:  
1. Review of hazards and vulnerabilities affecting the jurisdiction 
2. Disaster response missions currently performed and/or anticipated 
a. How those missions are performed (e.g., ground-based, 
rotary or fixed-winged aircraft, satellite)  
3. What gaps exist in the information gathered by conventional 
platforms? 
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4. Disaster response missions where the use of UAS will support and/
or augment existing capabilities 
5. What type of UAS (e.g., commercial off the shelf, military 
specification) is being considered? 
6. What are the staffing, training, and support requirements of 
establishing a UAS program?  
7. What are the anticipated costs to procure, implement, and sustain a 
UAS program? 
8. How will the program be funded? 
9. What will be the organizational structure for the UAS program (e.g., 
emergency management, public safety, department of 
transportation)? 
10. What are the barriers concerning the implementation of a UAS 
program and what is the mitigation strategy? 
11. Conclusions and recommendations 
12. Next steps 
 
D. IDENTIFICATION OF A FUNDING SOURCE 
Should the needs assessment indicate the need for a UAS program and 
approval to move forward is granted by the agency’s policy makers, the next step 
in the implementation process is to identify a funding source to support the 
program. As noted in the body of this thesis, while there are challenges 
concerning provisions of grant programs such as FEMA’s HSGP, SHSP, UASI, 
or EMPG, there are multiple funding options that may be available for the 
implementation of a UAS program. Additional options for procuring a UAS may 
include, but are not limited to, volunteer services, leasing, departmental or 
jurisdictional funds/budgeting, community and/or private monetary donations, and 
the donation of a UAS by a manufacturer. One important provision for 
consideration when identifying a funding source(s) is the ethical implications of 
an individual or corporation donating a UAS to a governmental agency. Agencies 
or jurisdictions that may be considering the acceptance of a donated UAS should 
contact their legal counsel or state ethics commission to ensure such acceptance 
does not constitute an ethics violation.  
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The identification of a funding source to procure or obtain a UAS 
represents only one area of a UAS program. In addition to the costs associated 
with procuring a UAS, funding must also be in place to provide for a variety of 
programmatic functions, including funding to hire and/or train flight crews to 
operate the UAS; procure sensory payload equipment (e.g., FLIR camera, 
environmental sampling sensors), provide for maintenance and replacement part 
costs (e.g., batteries, rotors), initial and ongoing training, funding PIC and visual 
observer certification/re-certification costs, obtain liability insurance (unless self-
insured), and maintain pilot proficiency. Absent funding for the aforementioned 
areas, the long-term implementation of a UAS program is likely not sustainable.    
E. DEVELOP POLICY/IDENTIFY UAS TYPE 
Once support and funding are in place for the implementation of a UAS 
program, the agency or jurisdiction should proceed with the development of a 
policy governing the parameters of the program. As noted previously, there is no 
national policy standard for UASs. To bridge this gap, Chapter VI of this thesis 
identifies recommended topical areas for a UAS policy. Additionally, research on 
the topic of UAS policies noted the inclusion of a policy model in a thesis 
authored by NPS alumnus John Wallace.212 Furthermore, Eric Holdeman, who 
authors a blog post for Emergency Management, advances a UAS policy model 
developed by John A. Gordnier.213 Regardless of the policy outline followed, the 
critical takeaway is the need to develop a comprehensive UAS program policy. 
The application for authorization submitted to the FAA will need to identify 
the type of UAS by size (e.g., small UAS if less than 55 pounds) and model (i.e., 
manufacturer name of the UAS), the UAS program policy should specify the type 
and model of the UAS to be used. It is also important to identify the type and 
                                            
212 Wallace, “Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems.”  
213 Eric Holdeman, “Model Drone Policy for Public Safety Agencies,” Disaster Zone (blog), 
entry posted March 9, 2015, http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/
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model of the UAS that will be used as it will frame the type of training that is 
necessary prior to the deployment of the platform.  
F. FILE COA/FLIGHT APPROVAL APPLICATION 
As noted previously in this thesis, the submission of a COA request or 
flight approval application to the FAA is required prior to the implementation of a 
governmental UAS program. Although there is a provision in place for the 
issuance of emergency COAs within 24 hours, these approvals are only for short-
term UAS deployments. The standard COA approval process for UASs typically 
results in a formal response within 60 days of the submission of the application. 
The COA process as of the date of this thesis involves an online submission. The 
link to the online COA application process is https://goo.gl/QMcYz. A sample 
COA application, which is accessible on the FAA.gov website, is available at 
https://goo.gl/eJRifc. 
The FAA’s UAS Integration Office is the single point of contact concerning 
questions for the public or private use of UASs in the U.S. NAS. The current 
contact information for the FAA’s UAS Integration Office is available by following 
this URL: https://www.faa.gov/uas/contacts/. Assistance with filing a COA can be 
obtained by contacting the FAA’s UAS Integration Office. 
G. PURCHASE UAS 
Agencies and jurisdictions seeking to implement a UAS program should 
await the approval of their COA or application to operate before procuring a UAS. 
Upon notification the COA or application to operate a UAS has been approved, 
the agency or jurisdiction can proceed with procuring a UAS(s).  
As noted previously in this thesis, while the current stay on using EMPG, 
SHSP or UASI funds for UAS procurement and/or sustainment is unfortunate, 
other funding sources, as well as donations, have been used by agencies 
developing a program. For example, two UASs were donated to the Medina 
County, OH, Sheriff’s Office by a local vendor who was interested in a law 
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enforcement perspective as it developed its product line.214 By partnering with a 
private sector entity, the Medina County Sheriff’s Office was able to implement a 
UAS program that may not have been feasible otherwise due to budgetary 
restraints. While it may not be practical for every agency, if funding is limited, the 
donation of a UAS may offer a pragmatic solution for obtaining a UAS. As noted 
previously, prior to accepting a donated UAS, the agency or jurisdiction should 
contact its legal department or state ethics commission to ensure such receipt is 
authorized under local or state law.  
Recognizing the procurement of a UAS can pose a challenge for many 
small agencies, this thesis encourages departments to consider small UASs 
when developing a UAS program as a means to mitigate this barrier. Small UASs 
weighing less than 5 pounds (2.2 kg) are significantly less expensive and are 
more rapidly deployable than larger UASs, which is an area of consideration 
when developing a UAS program. However, small UASs present operational 
challenges as they are typically more susceptible to air currents, have a smaller 
payload capacity, and due to having a shorter batter life, offer a reduced 
operational capability in comparison to larger UASs.215 As technology evolves, it 
is expected that manufactures will implement mitigation strategies to address the 
aforementioned limitations. Therefore, agencies and jurisdictions should ensure 
they fully research the needs of their UAS program prior to procurement.  
H. ESTABLISH PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND EDUCATION OUTREACH 
PROGRAM 
Given the media coverage and public perception concerning the domestic 
use of UASs in the NAS of the United States, it would be prudent for the 
agencies implementing a UAS program to consider establishing a public 
engagement and education outreach program. When the public is not educated 
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in the benefits of a UAS program, the agency or jurisdiction is limited in its ability 
to control the narrative concerning the implementation of the program. Such an 
oversight can result in a significant undermining of the program and a loss of 
public support. Chapter V of this thesis notes an example of such a loss of public 
support concerning the Seattle PD’s short-lived UAS program. In this particular 
case, the Seattle PD had purchased two UASs and the program was reportedly 
canceled after a public outcry by the general public and a lack of support from 
city council and the mayor’s office.216 Such a public reaction has the potential to 
not only undermine a UAS program but can also erode public confidence in 
government agencies. The implementation of a public engagement and 
education outreach program can assail the espousing of potential concerns, 
rumors, and misinformation that may otherwise fester unabated concerning the 
humanitarian benefits of a UAS program. 
While not inclusive, potential components of a public engagement and 
education outreach program include the use of public meetings, press releases 
via traditional media and social media platforms, TED Talks,217 and general 
public service announcements. A comprehensive public engagement and 
education outreach program using a variety of media platforms would assist 
agencies and jurisdictions in controlling the narrative concerning the 
humanitarian benefits offered by UASs.  
I. OPERATIONALIZE UAS 
Operationalizing a UAS program includes developing SOPs, identifying 
the training curriculum for the flight crew, identifying and training the flight crew, 
ongoing maintenance operations, sustaining ongoing/in-service training, and 
maintaining program documentation.  
                                            
216 Clarridge, “Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program.”  
217 TED Talks represent a relatively new concept of using short video presentations to 
convey new or innovative content. The typical TED Talk is less than 18 minutes in duration. More 
information on TED Talks is available at https://www.ted.com/.  
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J. DEVELOP SOP 
Just as there is no national policy model for UASs, there is also a lack of a 
national SOP model. While an SOP for UASs may contain many of the 
components listed in a UAS policy (e.g., flight crew description, pre-flight, flight, 
post-flight duties and responsibilities), it is incumbent upon each agency 
implementing a UAS program to develop an SOP based on criteria they develop 
internally. In addition, an SOP should include, but is not limited to, minimum flight 
crew staffing levels (i.e., the flight crew for each UAS flight must, at a minimum, 
have a PIC and visual observer); call out procedures; emergency procedures; 
mission abort procedures; reporting requirements for flight operations; flight 
checklists; notification procedures for reporting in-flight incidents, near-misses, or 
crashes; transportation and storage procedures; record retention guidelines; 
competency training requirements (e.g., at least three takeoffs and landings 
within a 90-day period); and system propulsion information (i.e., battery or 
gasoline powered).  
Research for this thesis identified an open source SOP for the North 
Texas Drone User Group that can serve as a reference for agencies or 
jurisdictions considering the implementation of a UAS program. The North Texas 
Drone User Group SOP is available at: http://goo.gl/t49mX9. 
Additionally, agencies should consider including information concerning 
the FAA’s B4UFLY app in their SOPs. The B4UFLY app “is an easy-to-use 
smartphone app that helps unmanned aircraft operators determine whether there 
are any restrictions or requirements in effect at the location where they want to 
fly.”218 The app is downloadable from the App Store for iOS devices or from the 
Play Store for Android devices.219 Although not a requirement, the app is a 
valuable tool that is available to UAS flight crews to assist with pre-flight 
planning.  
                                            
218 Federal Aviation Administration, “B4UFLY Smartphone App,” Federal Aviation 
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219 Ibid.   
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K. IDENTIFY TRAINING CURRICULUM 
As noted in Chapter III of this thesis, the current certification requirements 
established by the FAA, which are subject to change, specify a pilot certificate 
(e.g., airline transport, commercial, private, recreational, or sport pilot certificate) 
is required for both the PIC and visual observer for UAS flight operations 
conducted in controlled airspace (e.g., Class A, B, C, D, E) and uncontrolled 
airspace (e.g., Class G).220 Minimum pilot qualifications by airspace classification 
are listed in Figure 10. While a pilot certificate is currently required for controlled 
and uncontrolled airspace, a proposed FAA UAS rule, Operation and Certification 
of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, would authorize the operation of a UAS in 
uncontrolled airspace without the requirement to obtain a pilot certificate as long 
as the PIC and visual observer have successfully completed the FAA Knowledge 
Test.221 Additionally, until such time formal UAS flight training is recommended 
or required by the FAA, PICs and visual observers should follow the training 
recommendations outlined by the UAS manufacturer.  
 
                                            
220 Federal Aviation Administration, “Airworthiness Certification;” Federal Aviation 
Administration, “Section 333 Frequently Asked Questions.”  
221 Federal Aviation Administration, “Operation and Certification.”  
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Figure 10.  Airspace Classification 
 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration, Instrument Flying Handbook, 1–3. 
L. IDENTIFY AND TRAIN FLIGHT CREW 
Once the training curriculum has been determined and proceduralized, the 
UAS flight crew should be identified and trained in accordance with (IAW) the 
training curriculum. If the PIC and visual observer maintain a current FAA pilot 
certification, they should only need to complete additional flight certification 
requirements as deemed necessary by the FAA or the agency’s UAS program. 
Regardless of whether the PIC and/or visual observer maintain a current FAA 
pilot certification, all flight crew members should complete the training 
requirements as outlined by the UAS manufacturer. Should the FAA implement a 
standard UAS training curriculum, the flight crew will need to successfully 
complete that training as well.  
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M. PERFORM ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 
A critical component to any UAS program is the performance of routine 
maintenance and service of the platform. As noted in Chapter VI of this thesis, 
unless the agency fielding the UASs has maintenance staff with UAS 
maintenance experience or maintenance contracts in place, it is recommended 
that any maintenance exceeding preventative and basic upkeep (e.g., cleaning, 
tightening screws, attaching payload packages) be performed by the UAS 
manufacturer, especially concerning the maintenance of any electrical 
components. Additionally, maintenance logs are a requirement for all 
maintenance and repairs performed on a UAS. Furthermore, the agency program 
administrator should maintain routine contact with the FAA’s UAS Integration 
Office to ensure compliance with any maintenance requirements or 
recommendations established by the FAA.  
N. CONDUCT ONGOING /IN-SERVICE TRAINING 
While initial flight crew training is critical for the implementation of a UAS 
program, ongoing and in-service training is equally important and an integral 
requirement that should be formally instituted. The training should be consistent 
with the recommendations outlined by the UAS manufacturer and/or the FAA. At 
a minimum, the PIC and visual observer should complete three takeoffs and 
landings in a 90-day period. It is expected that training recommendations and 
requirements will evolve with the issuance of additional FAA rules and 
regulations. Therefore, the agency program administrator should maintain routine 
contact with the FAA’s UAS Integration Office to ensure compliance with any 
ongoing/in-service training requirements or recommendations established by the 
FAA.  
O. MAINTAIN DOCUMENTATION 
As with any flight operation, comprehensive and accurate documentation 
must be maintained for all components of the UAS program. The information 
captured for documentation purposes must be comprehensive, accurate, and 
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archived IAW the retention policy of the agency or jurisdiction. The 
documentation will need to be submitted to the FAA on a regular basis (e.g., 
monthly or quarterly) IAW the provisions of the COA or its equivalent 
authorization.  
Additionally, the UAS program should compile an annual report of UAS 
operations and ensure it is accessible for public review. As noted previously, the 
requirement to publish an annual report should be contained within the agency or 
jurisdiction’s UAS policy. At a minimum, the report should address the number of 
training and mission flights conducted, the number of flights that resulted in 
obtaining and storing information, the disposition of that information, training 
completed by the flight crew(s), and the approximate cost to operate the 
program.  
P. SUMMARY 
This intent of this decision guide is to provide a resource to assist policy 
makers and practitioners with the implementation of a UAS program. While 
information in this guide is current as of the date of this thesis, policy makers and 
practitioners should contact the FAA’s UAS Integration Office to ensure 
compliance with current rules and regulations governing the operation of UASs in 
NAS of the United States.  
Whether this document is considered in part or in its entirety, the key 
takeaway is the need to assess the need for a UAS program prior to 
implementation and to follow a process to ensure the establishment of a 
comprehensive, sustainable UAS program. As with any program, the agency or 
jurisdiction’s legal staff should be a key member of the UAS implementation team 
to ensure UAS policies, procedures, applications, training, and documentation 
requirements are outlined and consistent with existing procedures and 
processes.   
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